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POINT FOUR: A RE-EXAMINATION OF
ENDS AND MEANS
ON January 20, 1949, without warning or fanfare, a new moral and
financial commitment was thrust upon the American people. President
Truman pledged the United States to promote the economic development
of the underdeveloped areas of the world.' American foreign policy, re-
sponding to low living standards and growing demands for a better way of
life, took on its now famous "Fourth Point." 2
1. "Fourth, we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our
scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of
underdeveloped areas ...
"[W]e should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of
technical knowledge... and.., foster capital investment in areas needing development
"Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts,
to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical
power to lighten their burdens." Inaugural Address of the President, N.Y. Times, Jan.
21, 1949, p. 4, col. 3.
2. "More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching
misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life
is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to
more prosperous areas!' Inaugural Address, supra note 1. The President's statements
are born out by statistics. Some 28 countries with two-thirds of the world's population
are classified as underdeveloped (annual average per capita income under $100). DE-
PARTMENT OF STATE, Porxr FOUR 103-4 (Rev. ed. Jan. 1950). These countries are located
primarily in Central and South America, Africa, and the Near and Middle East. Id. at
15. The following table suggests the gap between the developed (annual average per




Per Capita Income 461 41
(U.S. Dollars per annum)
Food Consumption 3040 2150
(Calories per day per capita)
Energy Consumed 26.6 1.2
(Hp. hours per capita per day)




Life Expectancy (at birth) 63 30
Percentage of Illiteracy 5 78
(Age 10 and over)
* These official figures are assembled in Piquet, Point Four and World Production,
268 ANNALS 152-3 (1950).
The great disparity in living standards has achieved new significance with the rapid
advance of communication. The backward peoples are becoming aware-and dissatisfied.
Their "revolt against hunger and poverty" has been called "as great a threat to civiliza-
tion as the atomic bomb." Sir John Boyd Orr, former FAO Director, in the N.Y. Herald-
Tribune, May 1, 1950, p. 17, col. 3. Fortune has summed up: "Comparative living stand-
ards, once a statistical exercise, are now political dynamite." Point IV, Fortune, Febru-
ary 1950, p. 91. Secretary of State Acheson has served vrarning on Congress: "Increas-
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Point Four began as a mere statement of purpose, but it is slowly being
translated into a concrete program. Congress has authorized a small ap-
propriation to provide the backward areas with technical assistance.' This
assistance will enable underdeveloped countries to make more effective use
of available labor, capital, and natural resources. 4 But development can
not take place without actual capital investment.5 Although much of this
ing numbers of people no longer accept poverty as an inevitable fact of life. . . .These
are the facts we must face. What do they mean to our national security? To the peace
and well-being and freedom of the American people-in short, to the fundamental aims
of our foreign policy?" Statement of Secretary Acheson on Point Four before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, March 30, 1950. N.Y. Times, March 31, 1950, p. 4, col. 2.
3. A total of $35 million was authorized for technical assistance during the next fiscal
year. See N.Y. Times, May 26, 1950, p. 1, col. 8. $45 million had been requested by the
Administration. $10 million of the authorization will go to United States technical aid
programs already existing. Aid underway to underdeveloped areas through the European
Recovery Program will continue separately. See 96 Cong. Rec. 7811, 7829-30 (May 25,
1950) and DEPARTMENT OF STATE, op. cit. .mpra note 2, at 79-80.
The Point Four bill, originally H.R. 7346 (Act for International Development), now
Title IV of H.R. 7797 (Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950), gives the President
broad powers to use appropriated funds for bilateral assistance programs or for contribu-
tions to multilateral programs conducted by the United Nations. See Sees. 4 and 5 of
H.R. 7346; Secs. 404 and 405 of H.R. 7797.
From $10 to $12.5 million of Point Four funds have been pledged to the U.N., con-
ditioned on the size of contributions from other countries. See N.Y. Times, June 13,
1950, p. 1, col. 2-3. The U.N. technical assistance program, given impetus by the Presi-
dent's Inaugural Address, was formulated by the Econojnic and Social Council. It was
approved unanimously by the General Assembly on November 16, 1949. The program
calls for $676,000 for the fiscal year beginning January 1, 1950, to be financed from the
U.N.'s regular budget; and for an indefinite amount, estimated at between $15 to $25
million, to be financed by voluntary contributions from member governments. See Wilcox,
The United Nations Program for Technical Assistance, 268 ANNALS 45 (1950) ; TEclt-
NICAL AssisTANcE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (International Conciliation No. 457,
Jan. 1950).
4. Technical aid is a prerequisite to economic development. Usually it is in the
form of technical experts and information, and training for local personnel, See Eco-
NoMIC & SOCIAL COUNCIL, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, U.N.
Doc. E/1576 (Dec. 28, 1949). Technical assistance operates in such fields as health,
education and agriculture; transportation, communication and industry; public adminis-
tration, finance and social services. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, op. cit. supra note 2, at
21-33. For some dramatic results from past technical aid, see Statement of Secretary
Acheson, supra note 2, col. 4.
5. The lack of capital in backward areas is as great an obstacle to development as
primitive techniques. See, e.g., EcONOMIC & SOCIAL COUNCIL, EcONOMIc DEVELOPMENT
OF THE UNDERDEVELOPED CouNTRIES, U.N. Doc. E/1333, App. II, p. 2 (June 7, 1949).
(Memorandum of the International Bank). Technical aid alone cannot yield substantial
results: "What . . . is the use of bringing expert medical advice to countries which have
no ... adequate hospital facilities? ... [W]hat is the use of having the most up-to-date
advice in the field of mining if there are no adequate means of communication between the
mines and the cities and harbors?" Heilperin, Private Means of Insplcmentig Pobt
Four, 268 ANxAIs 55-6 (1950). The futility of depending on technical aid unsupple-
mented by capital investment was seized upon to good advantage by opponents of Point
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investment can and must be supplied locally, economically backward coun-
tries must receive additional capital from abroad if they are to develop
without severe hardships.6 Since it is the world's greatest source of invest-
ment capital, the essential task of backing technical aid with productive
equipment falls inevitably to the United States.
Under current plans, capital investment for economic development is to
be financed primarily with private rather than public funds.7 In this re-
spect, Point Four differs markedly from other programs of foreign aid. The
emphasis on private financing stems from the desire to reduce as much as
possible the tax burden on the American people. It stems also from the
traditional preference for private initiative in achieving policy objectives.
Since the war, however, private investment in foreign countries has been
Four: "In other words, the Senator's (Connally) method of encouraging peace in the
world is to send to the poor people he is talking about our technicians, our doctors, and
our consultants, and then do what? . . .We are going to say to them, 'Here is the pre-
scription, you poor devil. Now go to your own drug store and get yourself cured."
Sen. Millikin in the Senate's Point Four debate, 96 CONG. REc. 7811, 7819 (May 25, 1950).
6. The ability of the underdeveloped countries to finance their own development is
limited. Domestic savings are small, and what savings take place are poorly utilized.
In the absence of foreign financial aid, these countries must achieve "forced saving"
through inflation, taxation, or direct controls on consumption. See Ecouomic DEvao'-
mzNT OF UNDREVELOPFD CoUNTRIEs, supra note 5, at 6-21 (Report of the Secretary-
General). Foreign investment makes possible the development of the resources and in-
dustries of a country without tremendous sacrifices by its people. "Totalitarian govern-
ments have frequently expanded the production of their countries greatly, with almost
no assistance from foreign capital, but only on the basis of unnecessary suffering by their
citizenry. In other words, goods for export to secure foreign exchange and capital
goods that could have been purchased with foreign capital were produced instead of goods
for domestic consumption. Only totalitarian governments could force such privations on
their peoples . . ." Reeves and Dickens, Private Forcign Inz'eslhncnls: A Means of
World Economic Developmenf, 64 POL ScL Q. 211,219 (1949).
The world's total investment needs (outside of North America) have been estimated
at $43 billion a year for 1950-4, of which 8.5 billion must be provided by foreign invest-
ment. These estimates are based on current development plans. Some $17 billion a
year is required by the underdeveloped countries. $4 billion of this amount must be sup-
plied from foreign investment. The percentage of financing that must be done by foreign
funds increases directly with the lack of development in the underdeveloped areas: Latin
America-27%; Africa-43%; Near East-47%; Far East-53%. Ecooinc & SocUL
CouNci., supra note 5, App. I, pp. 12-13 (Report of the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion).
7. "We put primary emphasis ... on the need for stimulating an expansion of pri-
vate investment. . . ." Statement of Secretary Acheson, supra note 2, col. 3.
No appropriations have been made for public investment in the backward areas. The
possibility of future appropriations, however, has not been entirely precluded. As finally
passed by Congress, Point Four provides for "utilization of the resources of the United
States, private and public." (Emphasis added.) See H.R. 7346, See. 3(b) and H.L
7797, Sec. 403(b), quoted 96 Cong. Rec. 7811, 7825 (May 25, 1950). Nevertheless, with
respect to projects for which capital is requested, U.S. government agencies are to take
into consideration "whether private capital is available either in the recipient country or
elsewhere upon reasonable terms and in sufficient amounts to finance such projects." Ibid.
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small in amount and limited both as to area and industry. 8 Unless this
situation is corrected, present plans for foreign development are unlikely
to produce significant results.
A number of incentives have been proposed to stimulate the flow of
private investment abroad. To be successful, these incentives must do more
than increase the general level of private investment. They must promote
investment which is consistent with the specific objectives of foreign develop-
ment. If they prove inadequate to this task-and if Point Four is taken
seriously as a national objective-an alternative form of public investment
must be devised. Properly conceived, therefore, the problem of Point Four
is that of finding the most effective combination of private and government
action. Whatever combination is finally chosen, it is likely to involve new
institutions and new legal doctrines. The success of Point Four depends on
the successful solution of these joint questions of law and policy.
WHY A POINT FOUR PROGRAM?
There can be no agreement on how best to implement Point Four until
there is some measure of agreement on the precise goals that the program
is meant to achieve.9 Characterizations of Point Four's objectives differ
8. United States private investment for the four post-war years 1946-9 totalled only
$2.5 billion or one-tenth of the $25 billion in government loans and grants made available
during this period. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, THE EcONOmIc REPORT OF Till,
PRESIDENT, Tables C-35 and C-37 (1950). Public funds--/4 of them from the United
States and Canada-have accounted for over 90% of total foreign investment since the
var. ECONoMIC & SOCIAL COUNCIL, supra note 5, App. I, p. 2 (Report of the Food and
Agriculture Organization). Over two-thirds of direct investments in facilities overseas
during 1945-8 were in petroleum. A large portion of these were in Latin America and
the Middle East. ROSENTHAL, WHERE IS THE MONEY COMING FROM? 36-7 (Public
Affairs Institute, Bold New Program Series, No. 8, 1950). Private investment declined
from $1 billion in 1948 to $374 million in 1949, due largely to cutbacks in petroleum in-
vestment. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, THE ECONOMIC REPORT OF TIlE PRESIDENT,
Table C-35 (1950) ; Business Week, Feb. 25, 1950, p. 129.
An increase in private investment under Point Four will have to be achieved by increas-
ing direct investments rather than investments in foreign securities. Public confidence ill
foreign issues has been impaired by a history of widespread defaults. Furthermore, port-
folio investment does not represent the best way to achieve development of the backward
areas. Direct operation of enterprises abroad assures control over the use of investment
funds; brings technical assistance with investment; and avoids inflexible service charges on
the exchange resources of underdeveloped countries. See generally, LEWIS, THE UNITED
STATES AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROBLEMS 141-6 (1948) ; Coudert & Lans, Direct For-
eign Investment in Underdeveloped Countries: Some Practical Problems, 11 LAW &
CONTEMP. PRoB. 741, 742-5 (1946).
9. Of course, some profess to see no purpose in developing the backward areas at
all: "It is of the utmost importance not to accept the principle of Point Four .... We
cannot give our cake away and eat it too." HAZLITT, ILLUSIONS OF POINT FOUR 44-5
(Foundation for Economic Education 1950). "Once you accept the premise that it is the
duty of the United States to provide for economically-backward peoples, everywhere,
there is literally no place to stop." Wall Street Journal, Sept. 29, 1949, p. 6, col. 1. In
the United States Senate, a move to kill all Point Four appropriations failed by the narrow
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strildngly in emphasis. Some see the program primarily as a vehicle for the
spread of free enterprise.10 Others see it primarily as a weapon against the
Soviet Union.' Official statements, on the other hand, emphasize objectives
that are far broader in scope.
Although the fact is not always articulated, Point Four seems essentially
to be grounded in humanitarianism.12  Its first objective is to promote
higher living standards in the underdeveloped areas. But greater wealth
is not desired for its own sake alone. It is supposed to provide the material
environment necessary for greater freedom, opportunity, and personal
dignity.13
margin of one vote. N.Y. Times, May 6, 1950, p. 1, col. 8. Senator Robert A. Taft, R.,
Ohio, protested that Point Four had not been justified by any "intelligent presentation"
and was "just another method of spreading government money around the world." Id.
at p. 2, col. 7. Senatorial opposition to the program erupted in a full-fledged debate on
May 23-5, 1950. Senators Millikin, Wherry and Taft challenged the basic assumptions
behind foreign development See 96 CONG. REc. 7602 et scq., especially 7812, 7&6-&,
7838-9 (May 23, 1950). Sen. Millikin called Point Four a "damnable provision" and
evoked a demonstration from the galleries with a ringing peroration: "We will be so
involved in it that we will never be able to terminate it. We will have such big payrolls,
so many vested interests, so many clerks, so many lawyers, so many commissions, so many
joint commissions, that there will be no way in God's world of getting rid of it." Id. at
7818-9.
10. "[Countries which desire our help would be more or less required to accept the
free-enterprise system of operations." Hendershot, Back-ward Nations, N.Y. World
Telegram-Sun, Feb. 29, 1950. "American private enterprise must form the cornerstone
of the program for economic advancement in the underdeveloped areas of the world."
CHAMMER OF CosM!ssacE oF THE U.S., THE PoIN FouR PosrAR-A Busi~mss ViEw-
POINT ON THE PRESmENTS PLAN FOR EcoNomIc ADVANCEMENT OF UNDEDEVELOPED
AREAS 8 (Oct. 1949). For the approach of business groups toward Point Four, see NA-
TIONAL FOREmGN TRADE CouNcIL, PRIVATE ETRRIsE AND THE POINT FOUR PaC;n~ru
(May, 1949); U.S. CouNcIL OF THE INTERNATIONAL CnA,.ns OF Col-UI-c, INTELL-
GENT INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT (April 6, 1949); NATIONAL AssomAzioN OF MAru-
FAcTuRERS, THE BOLD NEW PLA-A PROGRAM FOR UNDERDEVELOPEo AREAS (May, 1949).
11. "Willingness to cooperate with the United States" in a "struggle against Com-
munism and other forms of statism" were conditions to be met by the underdeveloped
countries before they could receive Point Four aid under MR. 6026, a bill introduced
August 17, 1949 by Congressman Christian Herter. H.R. 6026, § 2. The bill was later
withdrawn to make way for the compromise bill, H.R. 7346, Supra note 3.
12. "The United States and other free nations of the world have a common concern
for the material progress of [backward] people.., as a humanitarian end in itself...
DEPAR mNT oF STATE, supra note 2, at 2.
13. "IT]he President's idea is a way to improve [the] material welfare [of the back-
ward peoples] and at the same time [help them] live as free men, retain their personal dig-
nity and independence, and develop to the full extent of their individual capadties. They
are offered a way of life that leads not only to freedom from want but also the most price-
less freedom-the right to be let alone." Address by Secretary Acheson, Oct. 29, 1949,
reported in 21 DE,'T OF STATE BuL. 719. Economic development by foreign investment
has not always led to these results. The reason is not only to be found in the errors of
Western imperialism. It is partly due to the fact that the spread of Vestern production
techniques does not automatically bring about greater happiness and contentment. See
Bowles, Point Four and Improved Standards of Living, 268 AnNAs 140 (1950).
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The various benefits to be derived by backward areas are also calculated to
yield substantial rewards for the United States. 14 An important aspect of
,Point Four is its place in a total program for American security." For the
present, underdeveloped areas in the Soviet orbit appear closed to Point
Four development. 16 But most of the peoples of the Middle East, Asia,
Africa and South America remain uncommitted in the world's great ideo-
logical and political struggle. A program which assured rising living stand-
ards in these areas would enable the backward peoples to satisfy their
various aspirations through free institutions and by peaceful means. In this
way, it could provide an effective weapon against political instability, social
unrest, and the spread of totalitarianism.17 In the long run, it could reduce
the threat of war and contribute to the achievement of permanent peace
through the United Nations.' s
14. "Our policy ... is based on the assumption that ... our own welfare is closely
related to that of other peoples." Statement of Secretary Acheson, supra note 2, col. 3.
This familiar assumption is supported at greater length in Hayes, Point Four i; United
States Foreign Policy, 268 ANNALS 27 (1950).
15. "In a very real sense, [Point Four] is a security measure." Statement of Secre-
tary Acheson, supra note 2, col. 2.
16. The Soviet Union has attacked Point Four as an imperialistic attempt to pene-
trate the underdeveloped areas, and has even offered the prospect of Soviet assistance to
countries rejecting United States aid. Yakobson, Soviet Concepts of Point Four, 269
ANNALS 129-131 (1950). Although the Soviet Union voted in favor of the General
Assembly resolution for the U.N. technical aid program, it warned that there remained
"different concepts" as to the nature of technical aid and "it remains to be seen which
triumphs." Id. at 131 n.l. In contrast with the Marshall Plan, aid under Point Four is
not now being offered to members of the Soviet bloc. See, e.g., the list of underdeveloped
areas in DErARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 2, at 15. Even if aid were offered to under-
developed areas under Soviet control, acceptance would be difficult. The "cold war" has
already kept most of the members of the Eastern bloc out of U.N. economic institutions,
and by December 1949, United States trade with the Soviet Union and its European allies
(Czechoslovakia, Poland, etc.) had dropped to one percent of total U.S. trade. Compiled
from figures in MONTHLY SURWVY OF FOREIGN COMMERCE OF U.S., December, 1949 (U.S.
Dep't Commerce, Bureau of Census, March, 1950). The Communist victory in China may
have cut off another underdeveloped area from possible Point Four operation.
17. "[The underdeveloped areas] must create a sound economic base for the demo-
cratic aspirations of their citizens. Without such an economic base, they will be unable
to meet the expectations which the modern world has aroused in their peoples. If they
are frustrated and disappointed, they may turn to false doctrines which hold that the way
of progress lies through tyranny." Point Four message of the President to Congress, June
24, 1949, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 2, at 97. But see The Economist, Oct. 15, 1949,
p. 824: "[Tjhe contributor to Point Four schemes would be mistaken in thinking that, even
where the spending of his money is successfully administered, it would serve as an immedi-
ate antidote to communism. Paradoxically, any change for the better in the Asiatic peasant's
miserable circumstances seems to wake him out of his fatalistic lethargy only to render him
receptive to communism whisperings that he ought to be getting more."
18. The U.N. might be strengthened if Point Four created an environment more
favorable than the present one for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. To
the extent that the U.N. had responsibility for carrying out the program, its authority
and prestige might also be enhanced. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 2, at 13, 14.
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The expected benefits of Point Four are economic as well as political.'0
Present levels of employment and income in the United States are closely
related to the current export surplus and the government aid programs that
make it possible.20 If these programs end without new foreign investment
to replace them, drastic adjustments will have to be made by American
industry and agriculture. 21 European recovery, not to mention the recovery
of the rest of the world, will be seriously jeopardized.2 2 A program of in-
creased investment in the backward areas would avoid these results. The
steady flow of dollars abroad would be continued. Although the European
nations would no longer be the immediate recipients, they would benefit
indirectly. By providing them with both new markets and new sources
In the view of some, "the success of the Point Four program may be a major factor in
determining whether or not we have to live in a garrison state." Salant, The Domestic
Effects of Capital Export Under the Point Four Progain, 40 Am. EcoN. Rsv. 495, 503
(1950). Note, however, the interesting comment of Rose, Needs and Resources of the
Brave New World, 268 ANNALs 9, 12 (1950) : "Almost without discussion, it is assumed
that . . . development would result in better-nourished, better-adjusted, more stable and
happier populations and nations; hence that the welfare of mankind would be advanced
and the world would be more peaceful. We need note only that the great vars of recent
times have not been fought by or in the underdeveloped areas; only those with com-
paratively well developed agriculture and industry have found it necessary, or have been
able, to engage in destructive modem war in a major way."
19. See, e.g., Message of the President to Congress, supra note 17, at 93: "To in-
crease the output and the national income of the less developed regions is to increase our
own economic stability."
20. U.S. exports totalled $12.0 billion during 1949, imports $6.6 billion, leaving a net
export surplus of $5.4 billion. MONTHLY SuRVEy OF FOREIGN C0um.mEnca OF U.S., Decem-
ber 1949 (U.S. Dep't Commerce, Bureau of Census, March, 1950). U.S. government aid
during 1949 totalled $52 billion in grants, $0.5 billion in long-term loans. Couza. or
EcoNomic Avisoas, supra note 8, Table C-37. By February, 1950, monthly exports were
$770 million, imports $599 million, compared with $1,044 million and $567 million, re-
spectively, in February, 1949. Suwvny oF CunzNrT BusinEss 2-3 (U.S. Dep't Commerce,
April 21, 1950). On this basis the export surplus during 1950 is running at an annual
rate of approximately $2 billion.
21. "If the heavy burden of adjustment is not to be concentrated over a short period
of time on a limited segment of American economic life, there will have to be continued
loans and (or) aid long after 1952." Harris, Foreign Aid and the Domestic Economy,
23 AcAD. Par Scr. Proc. 382, 395 (1950). Without additional financial aid, foreign coun-
tries, and Europe in particular, would have to reduce imports of American goads, increase
exports to the U.S., or displace U.S. exports in third countries. This "may very well
bankrupt many American firms .and seriously damage the status of industries dependent
upon foreign markets for 109 or more of their markets-for example, fruits, dairy
products, bread grains, tobacco, typewriters, machine tools, cinema products, textiles."
Id. at 386-7. See also Salant, supra note 18, at 499.
22. See e.g., the report of U.N. economists that "no remedy is yet in sight" for the
imbalance in world trade and the heavy dependence of Western Europe on American
dollar aid. N.Y. Herald-Tribune, Feb. 17, 1950, p. 9, col. 1. Further aid is necessary to
avert serious economic and political consequences. See Address of President Truman at
the University of Missouri, June 9, 1950, reported in N.Y. Times, June 10, 1950, p. 1,
col 8 and p. 2, cols. 2-7.
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of raw materials, Point Four would help balance their trade with the United
States.23 Finally, the program would contribute to the prosperity of the
whole Western world by helping to maintain high levels of American income
and employment.
24
Point Four cannot be justified, however, as a permanent means of per-
petuating the American export surplus. A surplus of exports over imports
can only be maintained by annual increases in foreign investment.2 This
so-called lending process would mean, as it has in the past, an annual gift
of the national product to foreign countries.2 1 Such a policy maintains
employment at the expense of real income. Furthermore, the same gift to
underprivileged in the United States would provide an equivalent if not a
superior stimulus to domestic employment.
27
23. Development of the resources of the backward areas may enable European in-
dustry to obtain raw materials more cheaply; Europe's dependence on dollar sources for
these materials may also be reduced. In addition, dollars invested in the underdeveloped
countries will partly make their way to European nations, further increasing Europe's
dollar supplies. See Salant, supra note 18, at 500. These consequences explain the state-
ment of ECA Administrator Paul Hoffman: "I think one of the greatest hopes for a
self-supporting Europe within a reasonably short period of time has got to come through
the development of these overseas territories. . . ." Hearings before Committee on
Foreign Affairs on H.R. 5615, 6026, 6834, 6835, 7346, 81st Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess. 417
(1950).
24. The relation between prosperity and a large export surplus is sometimes explained
in terms of the need of the American economy for a high volume of capital investment.
Pent-up demand has kept the proportion of American resources devoted to domestic in-
vestment somewhat higher than can be continuously maintained. Domestic business
expenditures on new plant and equipment dropped in 1949 and are expected to drop still
further in 1950. See COUNCIL OF ECONOmiC AnvIsoRs, op. cit. supra note 8, Table C-17.
See also Business Week, Jan. 21, 1950, p. 73. Since prospects for a substantial expansion
of domestic investment or domestic consumption do not appear favorable, foreign invest-
ment is suggested as a substitute. See Salant, supra note 18, passini.
The maintenance of American prosperity is essential for other countries because of the
intimate relation between U.S. national income and U.S. imports of foreign goods. An
American depression would soon be felt in the industry and agriculture of all the major
Western nations. See THE U.S. IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 14-16 (U.S. Dep't Commerce
1945).
25. New loans must not only cover the gap in trade but must also make possible the re-
payment with interest of past loans. Thus the gross outflow of new capital would have to
increase at a percentage rate equal to average realized interest and dividend payments.
Salant, supra note 18, at 504-6.
26. Seymour Harris estimates that the U.S. has exported $100 billion worth of goods
since 1914, received no more than $20 billion in return. Harris supra note 21, at 384.
Much of the gap is the result of two world wars. Much is also the result of the interna-
tional "confidence trick" by which loans are made which cannot be repaid, necessitating
further loans, and finally default. See CARR, CONDITIONS OF PEACE 269 (1942).
27. The United States, as well as the rest of the world, has "underdeveloped areas."
Political considerations aside, is a Point Four project in Tennessee less desirable than
one in the Belgian Congo? Not only does the former preserve the direct results of
development for the American people; it may have a greater total effect on domestic
employment and income: "[U]nless one is prepared to disregard the rate of change to
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The rational alternative to reducing exports or maintaining indefinitely
the present export gap is to increase imports and balance American trade
at a permanently high level. To obtain repayment of past debts, the United
States must eventually adjust to the role of a net importer.2 This adjust-
ment will enable the American people to share more fully in the gains from
trade. If vigorous domestic full employment policies are pursued, it need
be no threat to economic stability.?
Point Four can provide the tim and the means to make this change. A
program of investment in the backward areas could greatly ease the lack
of foreign productive facilities which is the principal reason for the dollar
shortage. Industrialization of the backward areas, bringing with it a higher
level of world trade,3o would help maintain American exports at their present
high level." Equally important, the development of these areas could
provide new and valuable American imports. By absorbing more raw ma-
terials from abroad, the United States could relieve dwindling domestic
resources and accelerate strategic stockpiling.? Gradually, the trade of the
United States and the rest of the world could be brought into balance. A
greater amount of free international trade might be facilitated. In this way
the gains from trade would create a climate more favorable to traditional
American economic institutions.
33
a given stimulus or is indifferent to the amount of spending necessary to achieve a given
result, foreign investment and home investment are not identical and cannot be so re-
garded" BUCHANAN, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND Domws-s'ic WELFARE 149 (1945).
Furthermore, $2-3 billion spent in foreign investment annually "cannot be expected to
produce more than a minor stimulus to American national income.' Id. at 142. But sce
Salant, sirpra note 18, at 497: "The effects of net foreign investment on domestic employ-
ment are, in general, as great per dollar as those of domestic expenditures! '
28. A creditor nation can only be paid back for its surplus of exports in the past by
developing a surplus of imports in the future. From an economic point of view, this is
not only inevitable; it is desirable. Imports, for which nothing is exported in return,
give us "more goods for the same.amount of work and thereby provide us with the op-
portunity to attain a higher standard of living... " Salant, supra note 18, at 510. See
also Hoovxs INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DOMESTxc EMPLOYMENT 20-4 (1945).
29. See, HoovER, op. cit. supra note 28, at 14; Salant, supra note 18, at 509-10.
30. Under normal conditions, international trade varies directly with industrialization.
See Industrialization and Foreign Trade (League of Nations) 14-29, 118 (1945). The
link between industrialization and trade is cut, of course, in the presence of non-economic
factors: wars, trade controls, and the deliberate promotion of autarchy. To a certain
extent, also, very highly developed countries such as the United States tend to spend a
greater proportion of their income on services, which usually must be supplied locally
rather than through foreign trade.
31. A steadily expanding demand in the underdeveloped countries could offset slack-
ening demand for American manufactures caused by satisfaction of Europe's wartime
capital losses or competition by European industry in traditional American markets.
32. See DEPAR rENT OF STATE, supra note 2, at 12.
33. This result could come about in at least three ways: (1) The increased supply
of dollars relative to the demand for dollars would make foreign exchange controls and
other restrictive practices less necessary. (2) Investment aid to underdeveloped countries
would enable these countries to develop their economies with less reliance on trade con-
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FACTORS RESTRICTING THE ROLE OF PRIVATE
INVESTMENT IN CARRYING OUT POINT FOUR
Any method chosen to promote the objectives of Point Four will face
formidable obstacles. These obstacles are particularly discouraging to
private investment, which requires a minimum rate of return and is less
able than public investment to ignore serious risks. They cast grave doubts
on the ability of American business to participate in foreign development.
One of the most serious obstacles to private implementation of Point
Four is the present world crisis. Countries within the Soviet bloc are closed
for the moment to foreign investment. Countries that are outside, but
peripheral to, the Soviet orbit are becoming poor investment risks. Even in
countries removed from the centers of conflict, political instability and
the possibility of violence on a global scale reduce the normal investment
flow.1 4
In addition to international friction, government participation in eco-
nomic life is itself a major obstacle to foreign investment. Some government
controls, of course, may be of temporary duration. Due mainly to present
disorders in the world economy, they may be alleviated by the continued
flow of productive dollar investment.35 Other controls, however, seem per-
manently entrenched. In many countries, government allocation of labor,
capital and material resources has become a standard and perhaps essential
part of development planning.36 Effective development can seldom take
trols and fewer controls on domestic consumption. (3) The political and economic
benefits of the program might reduce the need for government props to agriculture or
industry, and eventually the staggering burden of military expenditures. To suggest that
freer economies may be encouraged by Point Four, however, is very different from de-
manding acceptance of free enterprise as a condition of Point Four aid. See note 10 supra.
34. "Perhaps the greatest immediate obstacle to private foreign investment is the
present conflict of ideologies between the East and the West .... Not only is there actual
danger to the capital invested, but . . . economic conditions tend to make operation of
capital unprofitable and remission of profits, if earned, impossible. . . ." Reeves and Dick-
ens, supra note 6, at 226-7. See also EcoNoMIc AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, supra note 5, App. IV
(Extracts from Report of 3rd Sess. of Sub-Comm. on Ec. Devel.) 7.
35. See Black, The World Economy Since the War: Problems and Prospects, 26
VA. Q. REv. 1, 18 (1950), and VINER, TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN FREE MARKET AND
CONTROLLED ECONOMIES 87 (League of Nations 1943).
36. "[E]conomic development on the scale required in the underdeveloped countries
.. . is not likely to be secured without a significant part being played by national govern-
ments. Modern technology requires capital and technical skills, which call for govern-
ment aid in many cases and in some, even for government enterprise. Moreover, under-
developed countries are usually confronted with a scarcity of currently available resources
for economic development, necessitating their strict husbandry and regulated use, which
in turn involves special action by their governments." EcoNoMIc AND SOCIAL COUNCIL,
supra note 5, App. IV (Extracts from the Report of the 3rd session of the Sub-Comm.
on Ec. Devel.) 4 n.1 (quoting Report of Subcommission, 1st sess. E/CN.1/47 p. 14).
For a detailed exposition of the need for government planning in the development of back-
ward areas, see BONNt, THE EcoNoMIc DEVELOPIENT OF TuE MIDDLE EAST (1945). For
the predominant part that governments currently play in development of these areas, see
Hoskins, Point Four with Reference to the Middle East 268 ANNALS 85, 92-3 (1950).
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place without fiscal and monetary controls to check incipient inflation, or
foreign exchange controls to insure that the dwindling supply of foreign
currency is employed only for the most essential imports." Broad govern-
ment planning is often required to control population pressure 33 and achieve
essential social reforms.39 Finally, many countries-developed and unde-
veloped-are committed to some form of socialism. In these, private enter-
prise is faced with a steeply progressive tax structure. It may encounter
sweeping price and wage controls and competition from government cor-
porations. It may even be faced with outright exclusion from part or all of
the economy.
The inhibiting effects of socialism and the threat of war are further aggra-
vated by the rising tide of nationalism in the underdeveloped areas. Those
peoples which have reached the stage of self-government have been most
anxious to protect themselves against traditional forms of foreign imperial-
ism.40 They have enacted restrictions designed to control or perhaps dim-
37. Inflation and balance of payments difficulties normally accompany development,
especially in the early stages. Additional production of capital goods creates new money
income without a proportionate increase in consumer goods. Development projects, re-
quiring machinery and equipment from abroad, increase the demand for foreign exchange;
and by diverting resources from export industries, they frequently reduce the supply.
Higher domestic incomes and prices add to the demand for foreign capital goods an
additional demand for cheaper foreign consumer goods or luxury items which could not
be afforded previously. If development is to continue successfully, these tendencies must
be controlled. See ADLR, THE UNDERDEvELoPED AnR.s-THEM INDUSTiARLUMATIO 19,
22-3 (Yale Institute of International Studies 1949).
38. Population pressure is one of the most serious problems in development. Unless
development achieves a certain minimum rate, population increases (resulting from im-
proved health conditions, for eample) will outstrip the rate at which production of con-
sumer goods is increased. If this occurs, development w-ill bring a lower standard of
living, not a higher one. See Ecoiorc & SocAum Couxcn, supra note 5, App. I (Report
of the FAO) 20. It is significant to note that gross output of the backward countries has
risen in recent years by every measure except per capita. See Poit Four, Fortune, Feb.
1950, p. 91. See also Valeo, Point Four Problems in the Far East, 26S A:-,.,A.s 104, 110
(1950).
39. Perhaps the most important example is the need for reforms in land holding.
See the program of the U.S. Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction in China, dis-
cussed in Hearings before Committee on Forcign Affairs on H.R. 5615, 6026, 6S34,6 35,
7346, 81st Cong. 1st & 2nd Sess. 353 c scq. (1950). "More and more on-the-spot stu-
dents of Far Eastern Affairs are becoming convinced that further American aid in Asia
will fail as an Anti-Communist measure, unless it is based squarely upon land reform.
They do not decry the need for technical assistance, as envisaged in President Truman's
Point IV program. They do say that such assistance will fail, as it failed in China, unless
it is based on an improved peasant economy." Id. at 377. See also Peffer, Point One in
A Policy For Asia, N.Y. Times Magazine Section, May 14, 1950, pp. 60-2.
40. This anxiety was reflected in the U.N. report, supra: "[T]he introduction of
foreign capital should not be... made in a manner or on conditions which are detri-
mental to the national interest and sovereignty of the underdeveloped countries nor should
it be linked with any political or economic privileges for the capital exporting coun-
tries... ." EcoNomic & SOCIAL CouhcCIL, supra note 5, App. IV (Report of 3d Sess.
of Sub. Comm. on Ec. Devel.) 2. For past e.-amples of political or economic interference
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inate outside influence in native life.41 Even the more mature countries have
begun to enact legislation to preserve national pride and cultural independ-
ence against the spectre of American economic domination.42 Growing
hostility and skepticism toward the motives of American business do not
augur well for the successful participation of private investment in foreign
economic development.
43
Non-self-governing countries give rise to peculiar problems of their own.
In addition to native nationalism, private investment in the colonies must
often contend with hostile policies from colonial governments. Colonial
in domestic affairs as a result of private investments, see STALEY, WAR AND TUE PRIVATE
INVESTOR (1935). Note the resentment against foreign capital in the early history of the
United States. Id. at 390. Perhaps a suitable political climate for foreign investment in
the underdeveloped countries will be achieved as "national inferiority complexes" are
corrected and "small nations can be confident that their rights will be fully respected in
practice." Coudert & Lans, Direct Foreign Investment in Undcvclopcd Countries: Some
Practical Problems, 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 741, 759 (1946). A practical example of
this occurred when investing powers gave up their extraterritorial privileges in China;
that country promptly repealed legislation restricting the rights of foreigners to own
property. Ibid. Note the phrase in the President's Inaugural address, supra note 1, Col.
3: "The old imperialism-exploitation for foreign profit-has no place in our plans."
41. "[T]he fundamental problem which now confronts foreign enterprise is that of
adapting itself to the new economic nationalism of Latin America and the Near and Far
Eastern Countries, exemplified by a wave of restrictive legislation, and, more important,
by the general determination not to permit alien capital to maintain a dominant position in
local life." Coudert & Lans, supra note 40, at 752. For enumeration of the kinds of
restrictions employed against foreign investment, see, Eden, Some Restrictions Abroad
Affecting Corporations, 11 LAw & CONTEMP. PROn. 713 (1946); Bonsai & Borges, Limita-
tions Abroad on Enterprise and Property Acquisition, 11 LAW AND CONTEMP. P0no. 720
(1946).
42. See, e.g., the French ban on importation of Coca-Cola, which had political and
social as well as economic origins. N.Y. Times, March 2, 1950, p. 18, col. 1. The action
of the French National Assembly can best be comprehended by those who have seen first-
hand the reaction to American business in Europe. "It seems that one of the sights of
Venice these days is the Coca-Cola gondolas, navigating the Grand Canal with their huge
yellow coolers amidships, dispensing pop to the Venetians in the shadow of the Palazzo
Loredan. It would have delighted Mark Twain, no doubt. But the Venetians, apparently,
believe the United States forced them to drink cokes as a condition of Marshall Plan
aid .... Similar suspicions afflict England, Belgium, Holland, France, and Sweden. .. ."
Personal and Otherwise, Harpers, December, 1949, p. 8. See also Roberts, Uncle Sani's
Friends Are Worried, id. at 47.
43. Yet many spokesmen for American business appear entirely unaware of the
problem: "Foreign countries can be shown simply and convincingly that the record of
American investment is almost immaculate." Address of N. A. Bogdan, Director of
Finance, Ford International, before the 36th National Foreign Trade Convention, Nov.
1, 1949, p. 6. "Old fears of 'capitalistic exploitation' are pretty well exploded except in
Marxist circles. . . ." Point Four, Fortune, Feb. 1950, p. 96. Compare the observations
in Condliffe, The Key to Economic Development, The Survey, April, 1949, p. 197-198:
"The Corporations may disclaim any interest in the politics of their operations. They
may be actuated solely by economic motives. But in the pursuit of profit-or merely of
expansion-their operations have political consequences and those of many kinds. ...
[T] hey arouse the envy and fears of other peoples."
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administration usually seeks to create political and economic conditions
favorable to the governing country. American capital that spreads American
influence, or causes competition for markets and raw materials, will not be
regarded with favor. Investment may even meet frank opposition if it
creates industries which drain rather than supplement available foreign
exchange. Private investment will be blocked at every turn by the colonial
government should it disrupt too far the political, economic, or social
status quo. 44
Political obstacles are particularly serious in view of the poor prospects
for profit offered by projects in backward areas.45 Private business can
rarely operate profitably in a country with inadequate transport and power
facilities, low levels of health, and a primitive agriculture." It may be ad-
ditionally handicapped by inefficient or corrupt local officials,' and by the
absence of trained native personnel. 4" Difficulties of this kind may be com-
44. For further analysis of the conflicting demands of the United States and the
colonial governments, see Emerson, Point Four and Dependent Areas, 268 Amu..s 112,
115 (1950) ; Dickinson, Point Four With Reference to Westen: Europe, id. at 122, 124-5.
With regard to the economic problem, The Economist, Sept. 17, 1949, p. 603 notes: "[T]he
private American investor who has money to put into the colonies certainly has to face a
formidable series of obstacles before he can do so.... New enterprises will . . . have to
pass the test of being dollar earning or dollar saving." With regard to the political
problem, ECA Administrator Paul Hoffman has observed fear in colonial offices of a
"new program of American imperialism to take over these colonies:' Hearings before the
Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 5615, 6026, 6S34, 6835, 7346, 81st cong., 1st and
2nd Sess. 417 (1950).
45. Private capital is not normally invested abroad unless the returns from foreign
investment are greater than those from domestic investment. "It must not be e-pected
that corporations managed in the interests of public shareholders should have to consider
investment under Point IV on humanitarian, political, social or military grounds." Bog-
dan, supra note 43, at 4. In 1948, American investments abroad yielded average returns
of 15.69, compared to an average of 13.87 in corresponding domestic industries. Point
Four, Fortune, Feb. 1950, p. 94, 182. Even this small differential is misleading: a large
part of the returns on foreign investments were frozen abroad by exchange controls. In
view of unfavorable political factors, few investors thought the slightly higher rate of
return abroad compensated for the far greater risks involved. The comparatively high
rate of return available on investment in the United States has therefore been called a
basic "obstacle" to private participation in Point Four. Id. at 182.
46. "[P]rofitable opportunities for private investment in some underdeveloped areas
must await the development of basic services in these countries. The lack of railroads and
port facilities, for e-cample, may make the utilization of certain resources impossible.
Manufacturing industries may not be feasible, because there is an insufficient supply of
electrical current." DEPARTMENT OF STATE, POINT FouR 62 (Rev. ed. Jan. 1950). The
deficiencies of underdeveloped countries in these fields are described in detail in id. at 21-3.
47. Private investment usually requires an independent judiciary and an efficient ad-
ministrative system to handle its relations with the local government and the local popula-
tion. See Sachs, Restoring the Econo.nic-Cultural Bases of Ancrican Foreign Imest-
ment, 23 AcAv. POL. Scr. PRoc. 408, 425 (1950). It is just possible, however, that business
has sometimes been more helped than hindered by the willingness of local officials to trade
special favor for cash. See, e.g., STAr.E, WAR AND TIM PRhvATE INVESTOR 184 (1935).
48. Enterprises can not be run profitably abroad in the absence of ex\perienced em-
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pounded by attitudes among local business and labor that are fundamentally
incompatible with the private enterprise philosophy. 49 Basic development
projects must begin to correct some of these handicaps before private in-
vestment will be attracted to the backward areas. Because they are long-
run undertakings, yielding low and uncertain returns, such projects are
seldom suitable for private financing.10
Even the establishment of minimum conditions of profitability does not
insure the successful implementation of Point Four by private investment.
The demands of the profit motive are not always compatible with the ob-
jectives of development. Commercial considerations have led private cap-
ital to concentrate heavily on investment in mineral resources and tropical
agriculture. 1 Development of this kind often provides the underdeveloped
ployees on the "intermediate" level-foremen, bookkeepers, field engineers, etc. The process
of transporting such personnel from the United States or training local personnel is often
difficult and costly.
49. American business will have a difficult time enlisting the aid of local labor and
capital in countries where the profit motive does not have as strong a hold as in the
United States. People who prefer leisure to material rewards, for example, will react to
higher wage rates by doing less, not more work. Note also, the psychology of the local
capitalist: "In more than one Latin-American country that is reputedly 'short of capital,'
the sums that have been spent in Paris in the last half century by wealthy natives would
have endowed the country with a modern transportation system and a well-equipped
industrial plant." Fetter, The Need for Postwar Foreign Lending, 33 AM. Ecox. REv.,
342, 343 (Supp. 1943).
50. The Economist, noting that 1/3 of all investment in the British colonies during
1948 was devoted to transport facilities, commented: "Behind this . . . fact may well lie
the biggest obstacle to any immediate flow of private dollar capital to the colonies....
The most urgent need of a great part of the colonial empire is capital for roads, railways
and harbours, without which other development cannot proceed. . . . Yet this is the type
of investment on which returns are likely to be slow and unspectacular-and indeed which
is regarded as being primarily, if not exclusively, the province of .. . governments rather
than private enterprise." The Economist, Sept. 17, 1949, p. 603.
51. The fact that over two-thirds of direct investment since the war have been in the
oil industry illustrates this point. See note 12 .supra. For a survey of the range of agri-
cultural and mineral products that have attracted foreign investment, see Lawis, Tu,
UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROBLEMS 86-107 (1948). The dispropor-
tionate emphasis on extractive industries can be explained by two factors: (1) Raw
material development usually offers the quickest and greatest returns. For example,
in 1948 American oil investments abroad yielded earnings of 25.6%, compared to 17.6%
in foreign manufacturing and 2.4% in public utilities. Point Four, Fortune, Feb. 1950,
pp. 91, 182. (2) Foreign investors must concentrate on production for export to their
home market. "The orientation of foreign capital investments must be determined . . .
by the effect the investments are likely to have on the capacity of the receiving country
to transfer dividends or debt service payments abroad. Investments in export industries
or in public utilities that facilitate exports (such as railways from production centres to
ports), clearly help raise the transfer capacity. . . . [I]nvestments in manufacturing for
the domestic market would have no obvious effect on transfer capacity. . . ." Industriali-
zation and Foreign Trade (League of Nations) 67 (1945). Erection of plants to process
raw materials in the underdeveloped countries would be a way of increasing emphasis on
local manufacturing investment, but many firms prefer to utilize existing plants in market
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countries with increased holdings of foreign exchange, and foreign corpor-
ations pay a part of their profits in the form of taxes or royalty payments.'2
But these rewards are frequently enjoyed only by a small segment of the
population.- 3 Natural resources are often steadily depleted without any
permanent addition to the country's productive equipment. The fruits of
development-higher real income and employment-are largely enjoyed
elsewhere. 54 As a result, commercially profitable development has frequently
left the backward peoples impoverished and resentful. 5-
areas where there are less political and economic risks. See Coudert and Lans, supra
note 40, at 749-50.
52. "[O]il and mining enterprises not only pay heavy royalties and taxes but also
usually earn more foreign exchange than is required to service investment... :' Point
Four, Fortune, Feb. 1950, pp. 91, 96.
53. "Whatever gain has been obtained for the national economy (of the under-
developed countries) was mainly received by the upper classes constituting a small
minority of the population . . .But the majority of the people continue to live as they
have for centuries on a level of bare subsistence." George Hakim, counselor of the
Legation of Lebanon at Symposium on Point Four held by the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, quoted in N.Y. Herald-Tribune, April 15, 1950, p. 2, col. 4.
Thus an additional problem is raised: even if royalty or tax payments are substantial,
how can their productive employment for the general welfare be insured? The ruling
groups of many underdeveloped countries are either corrupt, indifferent to the needs of
the masses, or at best simply devoid of the knowledge required to put the funds to
effective use. Even where a private enterprise makes these problems its concern, it will
be in a poor position to aid in their solution. Setting conditions on how funds should be
used may mean losing a concession to a competitor who is somewhat less concerned with
the public welfare; further, it will bring from vested local interests the traditional cry
of "intervention" in internal affairs.
54. Three reasons have been advanced to support this theory: (1) Since interest
and profits go to investors from abroad, the multiplier effects of investment are partially
removed from the country where the investment takes place to the investing country.
(2) The underdeveloped country is diverted into activities offering little scope for techni-
cal progress and does not therefore enjoy the advantages of modem technology. (3)
The terms of trade are unfavorable to raw materials, and tend to deteriorate further.
Thus capital goods producers in the investing countries sell their products at higher
prices, get industrial raw materials at lower prices. Meanwhile, the underdeveloped
country suffers both ways. See Singer, The Distribution of Gains Between Investing and
Borrouing Countries, 40 Am. EcoN. Rxv. 473, 477 c seq. (1950).
55. "[T]he preference shown by foreign capital for particular forms of investment
. . .as well as the tendency of foreign investors to insist on security of ownership and
property, brought about a stagnation in other spheres of economic activity which .. ere
more important to the welfare of the country as a whole. Thus, the process of indus-
trialization was hampered, and the human and material capacities of the local population
could not be fully developed:' BoNNP, TE EcoNonMic D ELOPmENr 0? Tnz MDorZ
EAST 97 (1945). A counter argument is frequently heard that foreign investment, though
it may have deprived the backward areas of the full benefits of development, has at least
left them better off than if there had been no investment, at all. This argument may have
some validity, but it loses most of its significance at a time when underdeveloped countries
are determined to develop themselves, and when the U.S. is seeking to promote develop-
ment for particular humanitarian, political, and economic ends. Therefore, "the main
requirement of underdeveloped countries would seem to be to provide for some method
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The tendency of private investment to concentrate in extractive indus-
tries is as serious an obstacle to Point Four as the factors which deter private
investment entirely. Point Four can achieve its purposes only by diversified
development. A certain amount of industrialization is needed to avoid the
past misfortunes of one-crop agricultural economies and to bring eventual
increases in living standards. The governments of the underdeveloped
countries want more than diversification, however. They are demanding
primary emphasis on heavy industry." This is largely due to a desire for
political and economic independence, as well as for greater military power.
American conceptions of optimum foreign development may find these
demands too extreme 7 No matter how these differences are compromised,
however, the result promises to be very different from the kind of develop-
ment generally engaged in by private investment.
The most confounding problems blocking the achievement of Point Four
by private investment may be neither political nor economic, but social.
It is far from certain that the private enterprise system which has yielded
successful results in the United States will yield equivalent results in the
underdeveloped countries. Grafting a highly industrialized, free-enterprise
culture on a primitive society is a process charged with difficulty. 3 If the
native population is not helped to adjust to new physical environments and
new social situations, economic development may leave them, and the rest
of the world, worse off than before. American business must be prepared to
supply that help. This is perhaps the most serious challenge that Point
Four presents to private enterprise. It must provide-not simply dollars-
but a way of life. 9
of income absorption to ensure that the results of technical progress are retained. ..
Singer, The Distribution of Gains Between Investing and Borrowing Countries, 40 Am.
ECON. REv. 473, 484 (1950).
56. The marked emphasis on industry may be seen in present development plans.
See ECONOMIC & SOCIAL COUNCIL, supra note 5, App. I (Report of FAO) 10, 12. See
also ADLER, op. cit. supra note 37, at 1 et seq.; id., App. IV (Report of the 3rd Session
of the Sub-Comm. on Ec. Devel.) 1-2.
57. The Communist victory in China indicates the need to begin development by
improving the lot of the peasant. Countries in the Far East urgently require improved
methods of agriculture, better implements, rural roads, water supplies, and electrification.
On the average, the governments of this area are planning to devote only 10% of investment
to agriculture. See The Economist, Jan. 14, 1950, p. 58.
58. "People practising their accustomed modes of production, their ancient family
and community life, and the forms of art and religion sanctioned by long usage, suddenly
find all this disturbed and their lives unsettled by foreigners who introduce articles from
abroad more cheaply than native craftsmen can make them, who ruin the livelihood of
native transport workers by the competition of their iron horses, who put whole villages
to work in factories and mines, and who desecrate the sacred places with tunnels and steel
rails." STALEY, op. cit. supra note 40, at 398. See also Bowles, supra note 13, at 145.
59. "Indeed, if America could export its capitalistic mores, it would do more for Point
IV than any amount of capital." Point Four, Fortune, Feb. 1950, pp. 91, 178. Apparently,
some representatives of American business still have not grasped the fact that "capitalistic
mores" do not always harmonize with an alien culture. Such short-sightedness plus the
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OVERCOM3ING THE OBSTACLES: THE IRLATION
OF INCENTIVES TO THE GOALS OF THE PROGRAM
A number of proposals have been advanced to overcome the obstacles
blocking private participation in Point Four. Each of the proposals provides
an incentive to private investment in foreign countries. The ability to carry
on significant programs of foreign development lies with the handful of
corporations that currently accounts for the bulk of private investment
abroad. 0 To be successful, therefore, the incentives will have to induce these
corporations to expand substantially their foreign operations. A general
increase in the volume of foreign investment, however, is not all that is
needed. Incentives will not be successful unless they direct investment to
specific countries and to specific parts of their economies. Furthermore,
an increase in investment should not be bought at the expense of other
objectives of Point Four.
The Tax Incentive
The first type of incentive to increase the flow of private investment to
the underdeveloped countries involves changes in the American tax struc-
ture. Proposed changes range from minor alterations in the treatment of
certain types of income earned abroad to total tax exemption of all foreign
income. These changes aim to increase the level of foreign investment by
increasing prospective profit margins. In return for a small reduction in
public revenues they are supposed to yield a substantial contribution to
the Point Four program.6'
United States citizens and corporations are currently taxed on income
derived from foreign as well as from domestic sources. 2 Since most countries
tax income derived within their borders, income from American investment
abroad is often subject to double taxation. However, a credit provision of
the United States revenue code allows income taxes paid to foreign countries
to be deducted from American taxes on the same income."
manifold social problems attendant upon economic development suggest that private enter-
prise may not be the best vehicle for adapting Point Four aid to the peculiar institutions
and traditions of the backward areas.
60. Although two to three thousand American companies have foreign branches or
subsidiaries, 10 of these have accounted for over 75 per cent of the net outflow of direct
investment capital since the war. About twelve firms accounted for half of the income
received on foreign direct investments in 1947. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 2, at 61.
61. See generally Allan & Coggan, Tax Plamnig for Foreign Trade, 3 TAx L RE-v.
23 (1947); Carroll, Tax Inducements to Foreign Trade, 11 LAw & Co:r. Pnon. 760
(1946); Share, Taxation of American Business Abroad, N.Y.U. Seventh Ann. Inst. on
Fed. Tax. 812 (1949).
62. See note 61 mp ra.
63. I2xr. REv. CODa § 131. See F-xhibit 6, The Tax Treatment of Foreign Income,
1 Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of 1950, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1950). As an alternative, a taxpayer can deduct foreign taxes from
his gross income under INT. REv. CODE 23 § (C) (I) (C).
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Two limitations combine to reduce the effectiveness of the tax credit. An
"overall" limitation provides that the credit for all foreign income taxes shall
not exceed that proportion of a taxpayer's liability which his net foreign
income bears to his total income." This limitation was enacted to avoid the
possibility that higher foreign income taxes would reduce an American tax-
payer's liability on income derived in the United States.06 The "overall"
limitation is supplemented by a similar "per country" limitation, under
which high taxes paid to one foreign country cannot be used to increase the
credit allowed for low taxes paid in another." With the enactment of tile
"per country" limitation, the "overall" limitation serves only to prevent a
taxpayer from claiming a credit for taxes paid on income in one country
which is offset by losses in another.7 The effect of this is to discourage
firms who have already invested abroad from spreading out to other coun-
tries. One of a number of Treasury Department proposals Is made in con-
nection with Point Four calls for the abolition of the "overall" limitation."
It should be noted that the credit provision has no value in avoiding double taxation
when both the United States and a foreign country consider that they are the place of
source for a given amount of income. Nor is the credit effective when the two countries
employ different forms of income taxes and different concepts of taxable income. Bilateral
tax conventions which iron out these inconsistencies are of some value to American
business abroad. The United States now has tax treaties with Canada, Great Britain,
Sweden, Denmark, France, and The Netherlands. Treaties with Belgium, New Zealand,
Norway, Union of South Africa, and Ireland were presented to the Senate for ratification
during the last session of Congress. Additional agreements with Colombia, Cuba, Mexico
and Italy are currently under discussion. See id. at 90. See also Seghers, How Americans
Can Best Do Business Abroad and Foreigners Can Best Do Bsiness Here, Ann. Inst. Fed.
Tax. 926, 954 (1948) ; Share, supra note 61, at 823, The Effects of Taxation on Foreign
Trade and Investment (United Nations) 34-55 (1950).
64. IxT. REv. CODE § 131(b) (2).
65. "The income tax law allows a credit, dollar for dollar, against our tax for any
income or profits taxes paid to any foreign country ... Where foreign income or profits
taxes are imposed at rates higher than those carried by similar taxes in this country, this
credit may wipe out part of our tax properly attributable to income derived from sources
within the United States." Hearings, supra note 63, at 92, quoting House Report No.
350 on Revenue Bill of 1921, 67th Cong., 1st Sess.
66. INT. REv. CODE § 131 (b) (1).
67. "With the adoption of the 'per country limitation,' the effectiveness of the 'over-all
limitation' became limited to taxpayers that conduct business operations in more than one
foreign country, and realize a loss in one country and a gain in another. Suppose, for
example, that a taxpayer derives $1,000 of income in Country A, and suffers a loss of
$1,000 in country B. On a net basis he has no income from foreign sources, and under
the over-all limitation, he is not permitted any credit for the taxes paid to Country A."
Hearings, supra note 63, at 92.
68. These proposals were presented to Congress as part of the Administration's tax
program. See the tax message of the President, Jan. 23, 1950, reprinted in N.Y. Times,
Jan. 24, p. 14, col. 8. The proposals are summarized in DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note
2, at 69-71 ; statement by Secretary of the Treasury Snyder, Hearings, supra note 63, at 27-8.
69. "The over-all limitation in its present form ... impedes the establishment of
additional enterprises by firms already engaged in business abroad. The risk of incurring
a loss, is, of course, the major obstacle to new investment, and the over-all limitation
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A second Treasury proposal would provide more favorable tax treatment
for foreign branches of domestic corporations. 0 The income of a foreign
branch has been taxed as soon as realized abroad on the theory that it is the
income of the domestic corporation. By contrast, the income of a foreign
subsidiary of a domestic corporation has not been taxed until returned to
the United States.7'1 Because it makes possible loss-offset and greater
freedom from foreign regulation, branch operation remains for many cor-
porations the preferable form of foreign investment.2 Exemption of income
held abroad by branches in the same manner as income held abroad by
subsidiaries would enable corporations to combine advantages of branch
operation with more favorable tax treatment. It would eliminate taxation
on branch income that is accumulated, reinvested, or frozen abroad by ex-
change controls.7 3 By encouraging productive reinvestment of profits
earned abroad,'7 4 it might provide a minor stimulus to foreign investment.
Another Treasury recommendation would alter slightly the tax treatment
of income received from foreign subsidiaries.7 5 American citizens and cor-
porations receiving dividends from subsidiaries have been entitled to a
credit against United States taxes on these dividends, proportionate to that
share of the subsidiary's total income that has been paid in foreign taxes.6
This credit, however, has been granted only to those holding a majority
interest in a foreign subsidiary.7 It is proposed to extend the credit to
minority stockholders, thus removing an arbitrary penalty on investors
tends to increase the burden entailed by that loss. Id. at 92. Abolition of the "per country"
limitation was proposed instead by the Tax Committee of the National Foreign Trade
Council. See International Trade Reporter, Survey & Analysis of Current Develop-
ments, Feb. 17, 1950, p. 2. The NFTC proposal would provide a somewhat stronger
incentive: American firms abroad would be able to average foreign tax rates, spreading
high rates of certain countries over income from countries with lower rates. Ibid.
70. See Hearings, supra note 63, at 90-91.
71. Id. at 90.
72. If branch operations result in a loss, that loss may be offset against income
earned by the parent corporation in determining its income tax. A branch may also have
a stronger claim to U.S. diplomatic protection than a subsidiary incorporated under
foreign law, and may have generally greater freedom from foreign laws and restrictions.
In 1947, approximately one-third of income from direct investments abroad was derived
by branches of U.S. firms. See id. at 91. For a summary of the relative merits of branch
and subsidiary organization, see Allan & Coggan, supra note 61, at 37 et seq.
73. Under present law, if income kept abroad by exchange controls is considered
available for use by the taxpayer, it is taxable. See Hearings, supra note 63, at 91;
Mackey & Smith, Private Capital Under the "Point Four" Program, 38 GFo. IJ. 32.
56, 57 n.93 (1949).
74. "[The change] would enable branches to obtain the benefit of tax incentives which
some foreign countries offer for the reinvestment of earnings within their borders. At
present a reduction in the foreign tax may be offset by a commensurate increase in the
U.S. tax, and the inducement to reinvest is dissipated." Hearings, supra note 63, at 91.
75. See Hearings, supra note 63, at 91-2.
76. INT. REv. CODE § 131(f).
77. Ibid.
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who are restricted to minority holdings by foreign laws.8 Such a change is
expected to foster a desirable trend toward joint enterprises among Amer-
ican investors or between Americans and investors of foreign countries. 71
These and other comparatively minor tax changes " can be justified on
the grounds that they avoid specific instances where the tax burden on for-
eign income seems unduly harsh. Such marginal changes, however, will not
greatly increase overall profit margins. They do not qualify as decisive
stimulants to increase the flow abroad of private investment., Con-
sequently, foreign trade interests have requested an extreme measure-total
tax exemption for income derived in foreign countries.82
Complete exemption from American taxes of income earned abroad
would enable private investment to benefit for the first time from foreign
tax rates which are lower than American rates. This immediate benefit
might lead to additional benefits, since foreign countries would now have an
opportunity to offer tax incentives of their own.83 But a substantial tax
exemption. is already available for corporations doing business in American
possessions, 4 in China,85 and in the Western Hemisphere. 8 Exemption for
78. See note 123 infra.
79. Hearings, su pra note 63, at 92.
80. Two other changes in the tax treatment of foreign income were proposed by
the Administration: (1) Taxation of U.S. citizens permanently residcnt abroad. Ex-
emption from Federal taxes has been enjoyed by American citizens only for the first full
calendar year of bona fide residence abroad. INT. REv. CODE § 116(a) (1). It is proposed
to broaden the exemption to include the first part-year of such residence, thus reducing
the tax burden on American personnel who participate in programs of technical assistance
or private investment in foreign countries. See Hearings, supra note 63, at 92-3. (2)
Credit for foreign estate taxes. Transfers of property held abroad by U.S. citizens and
residents are subject to the Federal estate tax. Although these transfers are frequently
subject to foreign as well as U.S. taxes, foreign estate taxes have not been eligible for
credit as have foreign income taxes. A final proposal, therefore, would extend the credit
system to this field. Id. at 93-4.
81. Even if reinforced by government guarantees, see pages 1312-15 infra, "it's
doubtful that [the proposed tax changes] will make a real break in the dam that is holding
the flow of U.S. capital overseas down to a trickle." Business Week, Jan. 28, 1950, p. 74.
See also note 88 infra.
82. See, e.g., NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 23.
83. Under present law, reduction of foreign taxes which are below U.S. rates only
increases the taxpayer's liability to the U.S. government. Therefore, preferential treatment
by the U.S. is a prerequisite to preferential treatment by an underdeveloped country. See
EcoNoMIc AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, sitpra note 5. (Report of the Sec.-Gen.) 27.
84. U.S. citizens or corporations that derive the bulk of their income from sources
within a U.S. possession (Puerto Rico, Canal Zone, Guam, Samoa, Wake and Midway
Islands) are exempt from the tax on such income provided the income is not received
in the United States. See INT. REv. CODE § 251 (a) (b), Share, supra note 61, at 818.
85. Corporations organized under the China Trade Act of 1922 enjoy complete ex-
emption from income and profits taxes, provided they distribute these tax savings in the
form of special dividends during the year. See INT. REv. CODE § 262; Share, supra
note 61.
86. A U.S. corporation that (1) does all its business in North, Central, or South
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operation in these areas has not achieved a significant increase in new in-
vestment8 Apparently, tax incentives do not sufficiently neutralize the
risks facing private investment abroad.s
The only result that complete tax exemption seems likely to achieve is
interference with the equitable distribution of the American tax burden.
Exemption would provide a windfall for existing investment. The largest
corporations would be the biggest gainers. They would also be in the best
positions to reap rewards in the future.P Thus total exemption of foreign
earned income would not only force upon domestic income a disproportion-
ate burden of revenue; it would foster concentration of wealth and economic
power."0 These effects might be transmitted abroad if foreign countries were
America, the West Indies, or Newfoundland, (2) derives 95% of its gross income from
sources outside the U.S. and (3) derives 90% of its gross income from the active conduct
of trade or business, is exempt from the U.S. corporate surtax. See INT. REV. CoDE
§ 109; Share, supra note 61, at 819. The surtax exemption usually is equivalent to a
total tax exemption: "The combined effect of this special surtax exemption is to exempt
many corporations who meet the requirements from all U.S. income and profits taxes.
In most cases the present 24% normal tax is completely wiped out by the credit for
taxes paid to the Western hemisphere countries." Share, supra note 61, at 820.
87. In 1940, for example, corporations that had bothered to qualify for the China
Trade Act exemption accounted for only 4% of total direct investments in China. Share,
supra note 61, at 819. "Past experience with tax exemption suggests that it is not likely
to increase foreign investments appreciably. To date, the surtax exemption granted
Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations appears to have provided a windfall to pre-
existing investments rather than to have stimulated new ones. The experience with the
complete exemption of corporations operating in China and the Possessions is similar."
Id. at 826.
88. "[I]nvestigations of the subject indicate that U.S. taxes have little 'eight in the
corporate investors' appraisal of foreign investment opportunities." DEmeArnTsr oF
STATE, supra note 2, at 69. "Non-tax factors have assumed an ever-increasing role so
that a trader's or investor's decision is made before he even reaches consideration of the
tax factors involved." The Effects of Taxation on Foreign Trade and Investment
(United Nations) 8 (1950). Tax incentives are particularly ineffective because such a
relatively small portion of foreign earned income is presently absorbed by U.S. taxes.
Credits and exemptions already in effect reduce total revenue on foreign income to about
one-quarter of what it would ordinarily be. Id. at 3 n2. In 1939, net income from
sources outside the U.S. totalled $378 million. Only $14.5 million was paid in taxes to
the American government, 4% of the total.
To a certain extent, complete tax exemption might actually reduce foreign investment:
"[I]f investors abroad viewed complete exemption as of temporary duration, they might
utilize it to repatriate their accumulated earnings free of tax. . . ." Share, supra note 61,
at 826.
89. Total tax exemptions are said to be "more valuable to the taxpayer, the greater
his income, i.e., the less by definition he is in need of them. The marginal investor ...
and the one who operates at a loss during his first years of operation, will garner little
or no benefits from the incentives which presumably were designed especially to attract
him." The Effects of Taxation on Foreign Trade and Investment (United Nations)
20 (1950).
90. Adverse results might not be so severe with the present relatively small volume
of foreign investment. But if total exemption had the stimulating effects that is claimed
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tempted to compete with one another in offering tax concessions to American
corporations, thereby employing more regressive taxes against their local
populations.9 In these ways a tax incentive strong enough to be of sub-
stantial benefit to American business would tend to create conditions at
home and abroad that were incompatible with existing domestic policies as
well as with the basic objectives of the Point Four program.
There is another fundamental weakness of tax exemption as a Point Four
incentive. At best it can only increase foreign investment generally, rather
than direct investment to specific countries and to specific parts of their
economies. This failure can only be remedied by withholding tax exemption
from all but certain governmentally-approved enterprises. An alternative
remedy, perhaps administratively more feasible, would be to extend special
subsidies to Point Four projects. The current preference for private in-
vestments, however, stems from the fact that it involves no cost to the
American taxpayer and no necessity for government control. The first of
these advantages is lost in any kind of tax incentive. Both of them are lost
in selective tax exemptions and subsidies. If such measures are resorted to,
it may be hard to defend the preference for private financing over direct
financing by the government itself.
The Antitrust Incentive
The American corporations which must bear the main burden of a pri-
vately financed Point Four program 92 are currently subject to United
States antitrust laws in their foreign operations. 2 These laws have been
called a major barrier to private implementation of Point Four.14 American
for it, a considerable amount of the national income, particularly of the higher brackets,
would go tax-free. Furthermore, no matter how large the actual amount of income
involved "the [exemption] proposal would appear to be particularly ill-timed now when
revenue requirements necessitate heavy burdens on income from domestic sources. Under
conditions where the income tax, essentially self-assessed and self-administered, is relied
upon to yield most of the government's revenue, any damage to the public confidence !n
the equity and fairness of the income tax must be scrupulously avoided." Share, supra
note 61, at 825.
91. As a result, exemption may be the cause of "taxes detrimental to economic
development and rising living standards." Share, supra note 61, at 826.
92. See note 60 supra.
93. The principal statutes affecting U.S. business abroad are the Sherman Act, 26
STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1-7, 15 (1946) ; the Clayton Act, 38 STAr. 730
(1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 12-27 (1946) ; the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38
STAT. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 41-51 (1946) ; the Webb-Pomerene Act, 40
STAT. 516 (1918), 15 U.S.C. § 61-65 (1946); and the Wilson Tariff Act, 28 STAT. 509
(1894), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 8-11 (1946). See generally, HUGIN, PRIVATE INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE REGULATORY ARRANGEMENTS AND THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS (1949) ; Toulmin,
The Law of Iiternational Private Agreements, 32 VA. L. REv. 335 (1946).
94. "The projection of the Point Four program throws into relief the manifest con-
tradiction between the Antitrust Department's doctrinaire attack on international col-
laboration . . .for American and foreign technical corporations and the fostering solicl-
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business, it is argued, must be free to adjust to monopolistic conditions
imposed abroad by foreign firms and governments."5 Whether this is a
desirable way to promote foreign development, however, may be somewhat
debatable. Changes in the antitrust laws may occasionally accord with the
demands of some foreign governments. But at the same time they may be
inconsistent with general foreign and domestic policies of the United States
and in particular with the fundamental objectives of Point Four.
American foreign policy has been directed toward preserving freedom in
international trade against private as well as governmental restrictions."
This is an important reason for the extension of the American anti-trust
laws to activities carried on beyond the territorial limits of the United
States."7 Activities in foreign commerce are no longer safe from anti-trust
prosecution if they affect trade in this country.S5 Export associations will
tude of the State Department for the enormous extension of American direct investments."
Sachs, supra note 47, at 429.
95. Id. at 430-1. See also Lockwood & Schmeisser, Restrictive Business Practices in
International Trade, 11 LAW & CoNrrM.. PROB. 663, 679 (1946): "There is a tide of
opinion abroad which insists that foreign capital shall become more closely identified vith
the nation in which it is invested.... Such adaptation would be rendered much more
difficult if our laws at home threaten prosecution for acts in conformity With the local
law. This would present an element of risk for which no compensatory adjustments
could be made. By this treatment of private enterprise we place another risk in the way
of private investment, and, by so doing, threaten the success of our Proposals [For
Expansion of World Trade and Employment] as a whole." The continued growth of
combinations in foreign trade have led some to conclude that monopoly is to a large
extent inherent in the structure of the international market and that an attempt to combat
it through the American antitrust laws is futile. See, e.g., Perkins, Cartels: What Shall
We Do About Them, 181 HAPFRs 570 (1944).
96. See, e.g., Chapter V of the Havana Charter For an International Trade Organiza-
tion (U.S. Dept. of State Commercial Policy Series 113 and 114). The United States
is currently injecting anti-cartel clauses in its "Point Four" treaties. See Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce, and Economic Development With Uruguay, Art. XIV 3., Message
of the President to Congress, Executive D, 81st Cong. 2d sess.
97. The Sherman act was for a time thought inapplicable to activities taking place
entirely outside the United States, following the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Ameri-
can Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). Subsequent decisions held
the Sherman Act applicable to foreign activity so long as it affected United States com-
merce. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir.
1945); United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 524-5 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
Accordingly, several corporations have recently been prosecuted successfully for activities
in foreign commerce. See note 98 infra.
International law recognizes the right of the United States to punish foreign violation
of its anti-trust laws if the violation (1) was committed by a United States national, (2)
affected a United States national or (3) exerted influence in the United States. See
BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 275-276, 302-5 (1946).
98. See United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947) ; Branch v. Federal
Trade Commission, 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944) ; United States v. General Electric Co.,
1948-1949 CCH TaAaE CAsFs 62,912 1 62,352 (D.N.J. 1949); United States v. Timken
Roller Bearing Co., 1948-1949 CCH TRAnE CAsFs 1 63,041 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
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be prosecuted as are other corporations if their foreign activities restrain
commerce in the United States, artifically affect American prices, or restrain
the trade of an American competitor.99 Even foreign corporations will be
prosecuted for violations abroad when these violations affect the United
States, and their officers can be found within American jurisdiction. 10
Carried to its logical extreme, the rule that restrictive practices abroad are
illegal if they affect the commerce of the United States would proscribe all
such practices wherever located. Few foreign economic agreements cannot
be shown to influence American commerce in some respect." 1
Extension of antitrust enforcement to foreign commerce has been coupled
with more stringent interpretations of the antitrust laws themselves. As a
result, some of the most typical forms of private participation in foreign
commerce have been rendered suspect. Price fixing 102 and market alloca-
tion 103 have both been held illegal per se. The fact that parties to such
agreements are in the relation of parent and subsidiary may no longer be
enough to validate them. 1 4 Nor will these agreements be saved simply be-
cause they are natural counterparts to an exchange of "know-how." 105
The exchange of future "know-how" may itself be unlawful. 10 Finally, the
mere power to exclude competition-even if unexercised-may be fatal.'"
Agreements concluded with foreign governments or made in accordance
with foreign legislation are frequent incidents to business operation abroad.
But even these are illegal if they shut off the foreign market to other Amer-
99. See United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass. 86 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.
N.Y. 1949) ; Webb-Pomerene Act § 2,40 STAT. 516 (1918) ; 15 U.S.C. § 61 (1946).
100. United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795 (1948).
101. "It is a matter of conjecture . . . whether under present day conditions under-
standings can be had with . . . international combinations without their having reciprocal
effect in this country." Schilz, Postwar Operations of Export Associations Undcr the
Webb and Sherman Laws, 31 VA. L. REv. 613, 626 (1945). Compare HoovEt, op. cit.
supra note 28, at 75: "There can be little doubt that domestic cartelization and inter-
national cartelization are intimately inter-related."
102. Cf. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
103. United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
104. Cf. United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio
1949); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947); Note, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q.
REv. 901 (1949).
105. The exchange of patent rights, trade marks and technical information upon the
manufacture and sale of a product is not illegal, since the essence of a patent is the grant-
ing of a limited monopoly. But if conditions beyond the terms of the patent monopoly
are attached to the agreement, such as allocation of exclusive marketing territories for
patented articles, the whole agreement will be invalid. See United States v. National
Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
106. So-called "cross-licensing" agreements to exchange rights to future discoveries
are thought to have the same restrictive effects as marketing agreements. See United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v.
General Electric Co., 1948-1949 CCH TRADE CASES 1 62,770 (S.D. N.Y. 1948).
107. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); United
States v. Griffith Amusement Co., 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
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ican exporters "I or restrict imports into the United States. 1" Concession
contracts or other types of exclusive agreements may be made the basis of
prosecution, even if they cause no actual injury to competitors, as long as
they tend to close out potential American competition. 1 0 A possible way
around these prohibitions might be for American firms to conclude agree-
ments with foreign governments through foreign subsidiaries.' But the
parent corporation may still be held responsible for restrictive arrangements
if it can be linked in some way to their negotiation."12
The threat of prosecution for such a wide range of typical activities in
foreign commerce may constitute a major deterrent to private participation
in Point Four. It may obstruct the exchange of "know-how" between
American and foreign corporations, or make it difficult for American firms
to cooperate in the projects of some foreign governments. But the exchange
of "know-how" is desirable only if it results in greater efficiency, lower
prices, and greater consumption.'" Cartels are particularly objectionable
because they limit free access to resources and foster unhealthy concentra-
tions of economic power. 1 14 They may interfere with the ability of the
United States and the underdeveloped countries to carry out commercial
or even political policies." 5 These results are the very opposite of those
108. If the agreement actually affected the foreign commerce of the U.S., the fact
that a foreign government was involved would not in any way protect the American
company. See United States v. Sielken, Equity No. 9-188 (S.D. N.Y. 1912).
109. See United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927) and Wilson Tariff
Act, 28 STAT. 509 (1894), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 8-11 (1946).
110. See note 107 supra. See address of Attorney-General Berge, CCH TRnM I.
REP. 156,070 (1945) : "Our trade, whether of exports or imports, cannot grow if cartels
determine who may enter foreign markets, who may sell or buy in the American marke,
and what industries can or cannot exist here or abroad."
111. Domestic corporations have escaped liability for cartel agreement entered into
by their foreign subsidiaries. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F2d
416 (2d Cir. 1945). Cf. the comment of HuGIN, op. cit. supra note 93, at 209: "It would
seem that, in such a case, a court might have been justified in going behind the corporate
entity to determine the real parties in interest and the true nature and result of the
arrangement. . . 2"
112. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 142 F.2d 416, 441-2 (2d Cir.
1945).
113. Cartel agreements may reduce the speed with which technological developments
are put into effect; or, by maintaining artificially high prices, they may prevent their
benefits from being passed on to the consumer. BERGF, CARTEL.s-CHALnxNGO TO A F=ns
WORLD c. 3-11 (1944); HUGIN, op. cit. supra note 93, at 214; Knorr, The Problem of
International Cartels and Intergovernmental Commodity Agreenmen s, 55 IYALE L.J. 1097,
1100-2 (1946).
114. See, e.g., Loftus, Middle East Oil: The Patten of Control, 2 mLro -EAsT J.
17 (1948). The Federal Trade Commission has begun an inquiry into the foreign activi-
ties of American oil companies.
115. "[C]ertain fundamental decisions affecting our relations with the rest of the world
have been formulated and put into effect by private groups.... These decisions con-
cerning our strategic materials, industries and trade, our Good Neighbor and our European
policies, our disposition of enemy property, considerations of espionage, secrecy and the
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which economic development of the backward areas is meant to achieve.
Consequently, there should be no antitrust immunity for foreign practices
of American business. Unrestrained private power in foreign development
is a poor way to promote the objectives of Point Four.11
The full reach of the antitrust laws in foreign commerce is still undeter-
mined."7 Therefore, the demand for exemption from these laws is fre-
quently accompanied by an alternative demand that they be clarified,
either by statutory amendment or by administrative declaration. Presum-
ably, giving business greater certainty in its foreign operations might pro-
vide a minor stimulant to private investment. But there are serious dangers
in attempting to impart certainty by statute. To be effective, the antitrust
laws must prohibit general results-restraint of trade and monopoly-
rather than specific techniques of achieving them. It is difficult to produce
certainty without creating loopholes through which the ingenious may
circumvent the law.
Administrative surveillance of foreign activities might avoid this danger.
Advance disclosure by corporations of doubtful agreements is a common
suggestion.11 But the value of this device is limited by the fact that the full
future significance of such agreements can seldom be anticipated. Consistent
definition and application of the antitrust laws abroad may only be achieved
with the establishment of a special administrative agency to police all
activities in foreign commerce. In view of the increased emphasis on for-
eign investment under the Point Four program, such an institution deserves
careful consideration. Here again, private enterprise cannot begin to im-
plement Point Four without a considerable amount of government control.
evasion of our laws, have all been accomplished without the knowledge of our government
or its acquiescence." BERGE, op. cit. mspra note 113, at 230. These results front cartel
operations are even more likely in an underdeveloped country. In the case of Middle
East oil, "an industrial empire is established within the local state, sometimes even coter-
minous with it geographically. Subject to the limited and specific stipulations of the
contract, this enterprise is almost autonomous; it has extensive rights which in other
jurisdictions are frequently reserved to the state. The local government has ... no
control over the destinations to which its oil is shipped or the political ends such ship.
ment may serve. . . ." Loftus, supra note 114, at 26.
116. Despite the protests of foreign trade interests, the trend still seems to be toward
more, rather than less, anti trust enforcement abroad. A bill introduced early in 1950
would amend the WERB AcT to increase the antitrust liability of export associations. See
Hearings Before Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power, Committee on the Judiciary
on H.R. 5041, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (Feb. 23, 24 and March 1, 1950).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Alkali Export Association, 86 F. Supp. 59, 71 (S.D.
N.Y. 1949): "[T]he possible legality of international agreements touching only foreign
markets . . .has not been overlooked." But see note 101 supra.
118. At the present time, disclosure is sometimes rewarded with a promise of immunity
from criminal prosecution, but the disclosing corporation is still liable in a civil action.
Furthermore, the Department of Justice reserves the right to change its mind as to the
legality of the agreement. See TIMBERG, THE ANTI-TRUsT LAWS FROM THE POINT 0
VIEw OF A GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY 42-3 (Practising Law Institute Pamphlet, 1949).
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The Treaty Incentive
One of the major incentives to private participation in Point Four re-
quires assistance from the underdeveloped countries themselves. The very
nations which most require investment aid have handicapped American
business with a host of unfavorable controls and practices. Multilateral
negotiations to ameliorate these restrictions have so far proved unsuccess-
ful."' As a result, the United States government has been urged to press
directly for their removal through bilateral investment treaties.1
Assurance of better treatment from foreign governments might increase
substantially the flow of private investment abroad. Investment treaties
will not be effective Point Four incentives, however, if they eliminate for-
eign restrictions that are fundamentally consistent with the purposes of
economic development. For this reason, each of the restrictions sought to
be eliminated must be weighed on its merits. Furthermore, even those re-
strictions that seem unjustified must be removed with tact and caution.
Point Four will not be successful if it is forced upon the underdeveloped
countries against their will.'
2 '
119. Early in 1948, the Havana Conference of the International Trade Organization
and the Ninth International Conference of American States at Bogota both devoted con-
siderable time to restrictions on foreign investment. The resulting documents contained
general investment provisions that were unsatisfactory both to capital-exporting and
capital-importing nations. See Lnivis, op. cit. supra note 8, at 262-71.
120. See, e.g., NATIONAL AssocIATIoN OF MANUFAcrURERS, TnE BoLw NEW PLA -
A PROGRAM FOR UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS 10 (1949) ; NATIONAL FonRM.= TRADE Coui:cm,
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND THE POINT IV PROGRAM 11, 16 (1949). The specific treaty
provisions desired by American business can be found in INTERNATIONAL CHAMRM OF
ComMERcE, DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CODE op FAIR TREATMENT FOR FoIZEI:N INEsT=E. Ts
(1949).
Negotiation of investment treaties has received official emphasis as an important
element in Point Four. See the President's Point Four message to Congress, supra note
17, at 101; DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 2, at 6S-9. A Treaty of Friendship, Com-
merce, and Economic Development was signed with Uruguay on Nov. 23, 1949. "The
treaty ... is appreciably broader in scope than existing United States commercial treaties
in matters relating to the encouragement of economic and industrial development. It
contains provisions designed to encourage the flow of capital, skills, and technological
assistance. . . . In this regard, the treaty is in accord with the general policy of this
Government for the encouragement of the economic and industrial development of other
countries." Dept. of State Press Release No. 916, Nov. 23, 1949.
121. "[W]e must make sure that [investment treaties] completely respect the indi-
viduality, the business mores, and the cultural preferences of other countries." Kreps,
Point Four and the Domestic Economy, 268 ANNALS 160, 16S (1950). Although economic
assistance to the underdeveloped countries may make possible the removal of some
controls, the sweeping provisions of the INTERNATiO AL Cu.mBsun oF CommERcE, supra
note 120, have been criticized as bearing "curious similarity to those stipulated in the
'New Order' ... which the German industrialists under the leadership of L G. Farben
considered necessary for 'fair treatment' in their negotiations with Austria, France, and
other contiguous countries." Kreps, supra, at 168 n.12. Compare the assurances in the
President's Point Four Message to Congress, supra note 17, at 101: "In negotiating surh
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Restrictions on Ownership and Control. A common form of restriction im-
posed by the governments of the underdeveloped countries limits the power of
foreign investors to own or manage local enterprises. In their most extreme
form, such restrictions prevent investment by non-nationals in certain
strategic industries, public utilities, or raw materials. 2 More often they
simply restrict stock holdings by foreigners in local enterprises-usually
to a minority share.12 3 But American investors have not been anxious to
share their profits. They complain that local control of business operations
means reduced efficiency and undue preoccupation with quick returns. 24
Ownership and management restrictions not only reduce the flow of private
investment abroad by limiting the amount that can be invested in particu-
lar enterprises; they may deter some American firms from undertaking any
investment at all. 125 As a result, the elimination of these restrictions has
been urged as a primary objective of investment treaties. 1 26
Despite the fact that they reduce the amount of private investment
abroad, most ownership. and management restrictions are consistent with
the political, economic and social purposes of the Point Four program. By
forcing American investors to combine with domestic investors, they in-
sure that profits from local resources are enjoyed locally. They reduce
foreign exchange problems caused by the need to transfer earnings abroad.
They help gain the cooperation of local business and government and
treaties we do not ... ask privileges for American capital greater than those granted to
other investors in underdeveloped countries or greater than we ourselves grant in this
country."
122. See LEwvs, UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROBLEMS 159-61 (1948);
Bonsai & Borges, Limitations Abroad on Enterprise and Property Acquisition, 11 LAW &
CONTEMP. PRODS. 721, 724-7 (1946) ; Eder, Some Restrictions Abroad Affecting Corpora-
ions, id. at 715.
123. See Coudert & Lans, supra note 40, at 752-7; Reeves & Dickens, supra note 6,
at 230-1.
124. See, e.g., Reeves & Dickens, supra note 6, at 231.
125. See the statement of Austin T. Foster, General Counsel, Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., Inc., at Point IV Forum, 36th National Foreign Trade Convention, p. 27 (1949).
See also Reeves & Dickens, supra note 6, at 231: "American investors feel they cannot
jeopardize their capital by a management over whom they have no control and in whose
business judgement they may have little confidence."
126. THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE DRAFT CODE, supra note 120, would
abolish foreign restrictions on the nationality of shareholders or members of the board
of directors (Art. VI). It would give foreign and domestic nationals equal rights to
make investments with a possible exception for "investments immediately concerned with
national defense." (Art. III). The Herter Bill, H.R. 6026, called for -treaty provisions
to protect investors against "measures which unduly restrict the right of nationals of the
United States to own, manage, and operate business enterprises within the participating
country." (Sec. 11(a)(1)). Compare the Treaty with Uruguay, which grants equal
treatment with nationals to foreigners engaging in certain enumerated enterprises but
withholds it for investments in minerals; and which reserves the right to impose specific
limitations on occupations engaged in by particular aliens. (Art. V, 1, 2, 3).
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frequently reduce the appeal of native nationalism.' -7 It is desirable to
find a way to retain these benefits and yet alleviate the worst fears of Amer-
ican business. One method may be joint ownership of enterprises under
temporary American management, with ownership and control gradually
devolving upon domestic nationals. 12
Restrictions on Employment. Foreign laws providing for employment of
local labor and technical personnel represent further attempts by the un-
derdeveloped countries to preserve for themselves the fruits of develop-
ment.129 Employment of local personnel, especially on the technical and
supervisory level, assures the spreading of skills and "know-how." 11 It
increases local employment and income. In addition, it helps adapt foreign
enterprise to native life. 3' These results are all basic to the Point Four pro-
gram. But American business has urged treaties to relax these controls
on the grounds that an efficient staff cannot always be recruited from local
personnel.132 Where labor restrictions make it impossible for foreign enter-
prise to operate at all, some modification may be desirable. 13  In most cases,
however, these restrictions accord too closely with the interests of the under-
developed countries to make their elimination by treaty either feasible or
advisable.
Minimum wage laws and other social legislation in foreign countries have
127. These advantages of joint enterprises are summarized in Coudert & Lans,
supra note 40, at 752-7. Compulsory partnership with local nationals is regarded favor-
ably by the Economic and Employment Subcommission of the Economic and Social
Council. See Eco~o.ic AND SociAL. Couxcin, supra, note 5, App. IV. pp. 12-13.
128. For recent examples of arrangements for local control coupled with temporary
American management, see Business Week, Feb. 19, 1950, p. 117. Some underdeveloped
countries are willing to allow administrative and executive control by foreigners provided
that provision is made for the eventual transfer of this control to domestic nationals.
See, e.g., Statement of Industrial Policy of the government of Pakistan, U.S. Dept. of
Commerce, Laws Regulations Policies and Practices Affecting Private Foreign Invest-
ment in Pakistan, App. IV, p. 8 (Feb. 15, 1949).
129. See, e.g., LEwis, op. cit. supra note 8, at 156-9.
130. "The greatest needs of the peoples of the underdeveloped areas are to learn the
significance of individual freedom and to acquire the ability to develop their own resources.
Both of these are primarily educational processes. . . ." Bowles, supra note 13, at 140.
The importance of training local labor in technical skills is stressed in Eco.,o=c %ND
SocIAL CouNci., supra note 5, App. IV (Report of Sub-Comm. on Ec. Devel.), 11-13.
131. "Suspicion of economic imperialism is least likely to attach to those enterprises
which manifestly seek transferred responsibility and initiative at the earliest possible
opportunity." Bowles, supra., note 13. Hiring a number of local citizens as supervisory
employees may bridge the "psychological gap" between foreign business and the native
population. See Coudert & Lans, sutpra note 40, at 750-1.
132. The International Chamber of Commerce Draft would allow foreign enterprises
to bring with them all the "administrative, executive and technical officers and staff"
which they require. (Art. VI.)
133. The Treaty with Uruguay permits free choice by foreign enterprises of technical
experts, executive personnel, and other specialized employees, regardless of nationality.
(Art. V, 4).
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also met with objections from American business. Allegedly, they make
operation inconvenient and expensive. Social legislation may not always be
compatible with economic development: if labor's share in the national prod-
uct is raised too rapidly, investment funds may not be forthcoming." 4 But
the power to allocate resources between labor and capital, consumption and
investment, is one which the local government will not want to relinquish.
Attempts to hamper social legislation by negotiation of treaties are likely
to,invite antagonism from the peoples as well as from the governments of
the underdeveloped countries. 135 Such efforts will frequently be inconsistent
with programs of social legislation being carried on simultaneously in the
United States.
Restrictions on Earnings. The underdeveloped countries employ a number
of measures which restrict the earnings of foreign business. The general
form of these restrictions is a high income and profits tax. Sometimes an
absolute limitation is put on the rate of profit that can be enjoyed by foreign
enterprises.'38 These measures often provide a vital source of revenue. 37
Business may also be required to reinvest earnings in the same or in other
local enterprises, and thus make a concrete contribution to local productive
capacity. 1 s
While such restrictions are obviously discouraging to foreign investors,
proposals to eliminate them by treaty have serious shortcomings. Existing
treaties frequently provide for equal treatment in taxation with domestic
nationals, and for taxation only of those profits fairly attributable to local
production. 9 But tax rates can impose a heavy burden on foreign en-
terprise without being technically discriminatory. Taxation of all profits
above a certain absolute amount, for example, might affect only large Amer-
ican corporations. The United States government has been urged to oppose
such measures. 4 ' It cannot easily do so, however, without seeming to dictate
134. See, e.g., Reeves & Dickens, supra note 6, at 232-3.
135. "Capital investment in these areas is essential, but it must be capital investment
conforming to proper regulations protecting the interests of the people, and particularly
the rights of the workers in the resulting enterprises. It must come, also, not as a
substitute but as a supplement to the efforts of the people themselves in solving their
own political and economic problems." Manifesto of the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions passed in London, December 1949, quoted in Hcarings on Point Four
Bill, supra note 23, at 438.
Provisions for paid annual vacations to native workers and for insurance against
discharge without just cause were included in the Bogota Convention (Art. 32) upon the
insistence on capital-importing countries. The United States filed reservations to both
these provisions. See LmvIs, op. cit. supra note 8, at 268-9.
136. The limitation may impose a maximum rate of return for the foreign firm in its
local activity, or a limit on the percentage of profits that can be remitted abroad. See
Reeves & Dickens, sipra note 6, at 235.
137. See The Effects of Taxation on Foreign Trade and Investment (Ujilted Nations)
4 (1950).
138. Reeves & Dickens, supra note 6, at 167, 236.
139. See, e.g., Treaty with Uruguay (Art. IX, 1, 3).
140. "[T]here should be no de facto discrimination against American enterprises ..
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matters of internal policy. Moreover, the purpose of Point Four would be
frustrated if pressure were exerted on underdeveloped countries to employ
low and regressive taxes, causing native resentment and permitting an in-
ordinate proportion of the national income to be drained away to foreign
investors.
1 41
Restrictions on Convertibility. Exchange controls are a prevalent form of
government restriction in the underdeveloped countries. 4 2 These controls
are usually employed to correct a deficit in the balance of trade. They are
often necessary to prevent the flight of capital and the purchase of non-
essential imports that threaten to occur in the early stages of development. 1'"
By blocking the transfer of earnings and capital, however, exchange controls
discourage private investment in the backward areas. 44
Negotiation of special provisions on exchange control is held to be an
essential step toward the achievement of Point Four.145 Existing treaties
already require that exchange controls be used only under stringent con-
by subjecting them to scales of rates which are so graduated as to affect such corporations
and not, in general, those owned by nationals of the country." National Foreign Trade
Council, supra note 10 at 21. The Herter Bill, H.R. 6026, Sec. 11(a) (2) (c), would
have made Point Four aid conditional upon the conclusion of a treaty committing the
underdeveloped country to pay compensation where it "imposes restrictions or charges on
.[foreign] property or business (even though on a nondiscriminatory basis) to such an
extent as to deprive [the owners] of any substantial beneficial interest therein" (Em-
phasis added.) It is interesting to note that no principle of international law prevents
discriminatory taxation against aliens, whether de facto or do jure. See 1 HDE, IN-
TRNA iONAL LAW 664 (2d ed. 1945).
141. "Perhaps the most important measure required in this area [to promote develop-
ment beneficial to the underdeveloped countries] is the re-investment of profits or else
the absorption of profits by fiscal measures. . . ." Singer, The Distribution of Gains
Between Investing and Borrozvng Countries, 40 Ams. EcoN. REv. 473, 484 (1950). See
also The Effects of Taxation on Foreign Trade and Investment (United Nations) 5
(1950). "[T]ax privileges granted in the past to powerful foreign enterprises have
often been the forerunner of anti-foreign sentiments and legislation which have barred
the entry of foreign traders and investors in many countries more effectively than the
equal administration of general tax laws would have done." Id. at 19. Private invest-
ment already receives a great deal of preferential treatment in underdeveloped countries,
either by general legislation or by special arrangements between investors and govern-
ments. See id. at 22-5, 26-33. In Iran, for example, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
received immunity from Iranian taxation during the first fifteen years of its concession
(1935-48) ; in return, it agreed to make a substitute payment based largely on the amount
of oil produced. This payment amounted to $3.3 million in 1946. In the same year, the
United Kingdom's income tax on the company's profits amounted to $10 million. Id. at 29.
142. See, e.g., LEwis, op. cit. supra note 8, at 148-50.
143. See note 37 supra.
144. See Reeves & Dickens, supra note 6, at 238-9.
145. "The protection that the American investor would require before venturing with
his funds into a foreign country amounts to a pledge of nondiscrimination plus specified
exemptions from trade restrictions.... [T]hese are matters which, exceptional cases
aside, no investor can settle with the foreign government; it is the proper object for
negotiations and agreement between the United States and foreign governments." Heil-
pernn, Private Means of Implementing Point Four, 268 ANNAr.s 54, 60-1 (1950).
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ditions and in a manner which does not discriminate against the commerce
of any nation. 14 These provisions are not much help to American business.
As a result, proposals have been made to exact an unqualified commitment
for service of capital; or alternatively, absolute priority or priority second
only to "essential imports." 147 Another and roughly equivalent suggestion
would require free convertibility for service of capital until foreign exchange
receipts fall below a specified amount.
4
Provisions of this kind are likely to cause hostility and hardship. Giving
foreigners exchange priority over domestic nationals would be less than
popular with the peoples of underdeveloped countries. Moreover, the pro-
visions would force the governments of those countries into an undesirable
strait-jacket. To be a significant aid to foreign investment, the term "essen-
tial imports" would have to exclude capital equipment and include only
those supplies necessary for a minimum standard of living. 49 Yet this might
prevent a domestic government from hastening its own development pro-
gram or from enabling its people to gain some current benefits from economic
expansion-benefits which they desperately need. 1 0 Consequently, specific
146. See Treaty with Uruguay (Art. XV, 3, 4). Neither of these provisions goes
far enough for private investment. Conditions of stringency are usually determined by
the capital-importing country alone. The promise to employ controls in a non-discrimi-
natory fashion is equally incapable of enforcement. If dollars alone are in short supply,
demand will have to be directed away from American imports. The United Nations
itself has found it necessary to "discriminate." See U.N. Will Favor Soil-Currency Area
in Buying, N.Y. Herald-Tribune, March 2, 1950, p. 16, col. 3.
147. The Herter bill, H.R. 6026, Sec. 11(b) (1) (B), called for a Treaty of Con-
vertibility in which an underdeveloped country would undertake "an unqualified commit-
ment of convertibility [into the investor's currency or other currency acceptable to him]
for the service on capital or . . . a commitment of convertibility into such currency with
either priority in the highest category or priority second only to essential imports."
These provisions are identical to those suggested by the NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE
COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 25. Capital service, as defined in the Herter Bill, Sec. 11
(b) (2) (A) "includes stipulated interest and amortization charges on loans, dividends
on stock or comparable equity interest, profits, engineering and management service fees,
royalties, copyright fees, but such term does not include except, in the case of amortization
of loans, the transfer of capital as such . . ."
148. Since the specified amount would be defined in relation to the need for "essential
imports," there seems little difference between the two provisions. See ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL COUNCIL, supra note 5 (Report of the Sec.-Gen.) 30-1.
149. The Herter Bill, H.R. 6026, Sec. 11 (b) (2) (B) defined "essential imports" to
include "only food (including seeds, fertilizer, agricultural machinery and other supplies
essential to the reduction of food imports), fuel, and supplies for shelter and the cure
and prevention of disease, and such imports only in such volumes as may be essential to
the maintenance of an accepted standard of living." Capital goods for development were
specifically excluded from this category. Ibid. The same definition was suggested by
the NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 26-7.
150. Holding people to a minimum standard of living may also hold down their pro.
ductive capacities. The opportunity to gain more than life's bare essentials creates an
incentive for labor. Further, an improved diet may provide a significant stimulus to
productivity. See Stearns, The Road that Food Built, Harpers, June 1950, p. 82.
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provisions which give private investors a fixed claim on an underdeveloped
country's foreign exchange seem incompatible with the fundamental pur-
poses of the Point Four program.
Government Expropriation and Government Compctition. The prospect
that property held abroad will be taken by foreign governments without
adequate compensation has become an increasing deterrent to private in-
vestment. 1' 1 Expropriations in the past were isolated events. Now they are
coordinated to meet the requirements of partial or total nationalization
programs. A commitment to refrain entirely from expropriation seems
impossible to obtain. -52 Most treaties simply provide for payment of "just
compensation in a prompt, adequate and effective manner" in the event
that expropriation occurs. 15 3 These vague provisions are interpreted
according to local law. 15 4 As a consequence, the private investor has
little assurance of how much, when, or how he will be paid. Business has
long sought adoption of the principle that compensation be paid in the
currency of the expropriated investor. 5 This principle is not acceptable
to the underdeveloped countries; it faces the same objections that are made
to specific commitments for convertibility. The best compromise that can
be hoped for seems to be a promise of eventual convertibility at the rate of
exchange existing when expropriation occurs. This would at least avoid the
additional hazards of depreciating currencies.
Complete or partial socialization abroad may mean not only outright
151. See Lmwis, op. cit. mpra note 8, at 150-6.
152. The investment provisions of the ITO Charter failed to provide security from
expropriation. Although the ITO members pledged themselves not to take "unreasonable
or unjustifiable action" against foreign investment (Art. 11, par. 1 (b)), they reserved
the right "(i) to take any appropriate safeguards necessary to ensure that foreign invest-
ment is not used as a basis for interference in internal affairs or national policies; (ii)
to determine whether and to what extent and upon what terms [they] .ilt allow future
foreign investment; (iii) to prescribe and give effect on just terms to requirements as
to the ownership of existing and future investments; (iv) to prescribe and give effect
to other reasonable requirements with respect to existing and future investments." (Art.
12). See Havana Charter, supra note 96; EcoNoMIc AND SOCIAL CouNcm mipra note 5,
(Report of the Secretary-General) at 29; ICC Draft Code, supra note 120, at 17-19.
153. See, e.g., Treaty with Uruguay (Art. VIII, 2). The Bogota Agreement (Art.
25) similarly provided that "an expropriation shall be accompanied by payment of a fair
price in a prompt, adequate, and effective manner." See Lzvs, op. cit. mspra note 8,
at 268.
154. Eight South American countries filed reservations to the Bogota Agreement
stating that the expropriation provisions, supra, were to be subordinated to the provisions
for expropriation provided in the constitutions of the signatory countries. Id. at 263-9.
The ICC Draft Code states by contrast that "fair compensation" be paid "according to
international law" (Art. XI a) and provides, in the event of an impasse, for interpretation
by an International Court of Arbitration (Art. XIII).
155. The Herter Bill, H.R. 6026, Sec. 11(b) (1) (A), following the lines of the ICC
Draft Code (Art. XI, c, d) provided for "an unqualified commitment of convertibility
of the proceeds of just compensation... into the currency of the investor's country or
other currency acceptable to him. . .!
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expropriation but competition with private firms by government-owned or
government-subsidized enterprises.156 The interests of American business
are currently represented in bilateral treaties by provisions that government
enterprises should occupy the same status before the law as private com-
petitors, and that they should conduct business according to purely com-
mercial considerations. 157 In practice, such provisions are of little value.
Consequently, American trade interests have asked for a specific commit-
ment by foreign governments to pay compensation not only for expropria-
tion but also for injury due to government competition and other govern-
ment action."' Thus business is demanding privileges abroad that have
been expressly denied it in the United States."' In an era of increasing
government participation in economic life, these demands are likely to pro-
duce much resentment and negligible results.
Subjection to Local Jurisdiction. With the demise of extraterritorial
rights,' investors in foreign countries have become almost entirely subject
to local law. 161 Treaties usually provide for equal treatment with local na-
tionals in protection of an alien's person, rights, and property.6 2 Equal
treatment is not enough to satisfy American business, however, when less
favorable treatment is received in foreign courts than would be accorded at
home. Since legal protection may be particularly inadequate in under-
developed countries, private participation in Point Four is likely to revive
the demand for treatment of aliens that measures up to a satisfactory "in-
ternational standard." "I It has yet to be decided, however, just what
156. See, e.g., LEwis, op. cit. supra note 8, at 164-5.
157. See Treaty with Uruguay, Protocol 1 and Art. XIV, 1. But government enter-
prises may be given more favorable treatment where they are "supplying, at prices sub-
stantially below competitive prices, the needs of particular population groups for essential
goods and services not otherwise practically obtainable. . ." (Protocol 1.)
158. Almost identical provisions to this effect were contained in the Herter Bill, H.R.
6026, Sec. 11 (a) (2), and in NATIONAL FORaIG TRADE CoUNcIL supra note 10, at 16.
159. Private firms have been refused compensation for alleged injuries due to United
States government competition. See Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938).
They have also failed to recover for alleged injuries due to reasonable administrative
action. See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
160. Extraterritoriality enabled citizens of Western nations travelling or residing in
certain non-Christian countries to have their disputes settled by their own judges accord-
ing to their own laws. See Brown, Exterritoriality, 6 ENcYC. Soc. Sc. 36-9 (1938).
161. See, e.g., BRIGs, op. cit. supra note 97, at 501-2, 507-9; LEWvs, op. cit. supra note
8, at 180-1.
162. See, e.g., the Treaty with Uruguay (Art. II, 1).
163. See BRIGS, op. cit. supra note 97, at 507-9. The Bogota Agreement (Art. 24)
provided that policies adopted toward foreign investments must be effectuated 'within a
system of equity and of effective legal and judicial guarantees." See LEwis, op. cit. supra
note 8, at 268. Compare the provisions (Art. V) of the ICC Draft Code: "Should the
nationals of one of the High Contracting Parties not enjoy the full benefit of the civil
rights generally recognized by the other High Contracting Parties or by international
law, the nationals of the other High Contracting Parties shall be entitled to such rights
and this protection shall not be denied to them on the ground that a preferential system
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fundamental rights of Americans are to be enforced abroad, and whether
they should be insisted upon even against the wishes of the local population.
The problem is particularly acute in cases of foreign expropriation. Past
attempts to enforce American concepts of due process in controversies
abroad have not improved business dealings or international harmony.
1' 4
As a result, the United States may now be precluded from diplomatic in-
tervention in some countries at least until local remedies have been ex-
hausted. 1 5
The limitations of treaty provisions in this field have led American bus-
iness to seek an expansion of commercial arbitrationYc Settlement of trade
disputes by private arbitrators, however, means less control over foreign
development by the underdeveloped countries and by the United States.
It may mean enforcement of cartel agreements or other policies which are
incompatible with the objectives of Point Four.'0 The need to combine
responsibility in foreign development with security for private investment
may require the establishment of a new International Court for the handling
of trade disputes. 168
Summary. Negotiation of investment treaties will not overcome the
obstacles to private participation in Point Four. Although present treaties
do not satisfy private investment, few significant safeguards can be added
without doing violence to the objectives of foreign development.c' Most
would thus be established in their favour." (Emphasis added). This provision goes
further than enforcing an "international standard"; it seems almost a partial return to
e-xtraterritoriality. See note 160 supra.
164. See STAF.Y, op. cit. supra note 40, at 435-454.
165. The "Calvo clause," included by many South American countries in their con-
stitutions, statutes, treaties, or contracts with foreign investors, makes resort to local
courts and renunciation of diplomatic protection a condition of doing local business. See
Borchard, Protection of Foreign Investments, 11 LAW & Co rrmsp. Pion. 835, 846-847
(1946). The effectiveness of this clause in altering alien rights under international law
has long been a subject of controversy. See BRIGGs, op. cit. supra note 97, at 541-2. It
would seem that an alien must at least avail himself of existing local remedies before he
can pursue an international claim. See United States (North American Dredging Co.
Claim) v. United Mexican States, United States-Mexico, General Claims Commission
(1926), reprinted in id. at 524-33.
166. See Rosenthal, Arbitration i the Settlenst of Interational Trade Disputes, 11
LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoB. 808 (1946). "[T]he international merchant needs legislation in
most countries of the world which will insure universal recognition of the validity of the
arbitration clause, which will adequately define the powers of the arbitrators in all juris-
dictions and which will enable the enforcement of foreign arbitration awards in the
jurisdictions of the losers." Id. at 833.
167. See Kronstein, Business Arbitration-Instrunent of Private Government, 54
Y.Aiz L.J. 36,56-57 (1944).
168. The present International Court of Justice is empowered to consider only dis-
putes arising between states, not those arising between individuals. Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice, Art. 34 (1). Further, the Court has no special competence in
the field of commercial relations. Thus a new international institution would be needed.
See Luwis, op. cit. supra note 8, at 260-2; Coudert & Lans, supra note 40, at 758.
169. The treaty with Uruguay grants private investment substantially all the safe-
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foreign controls and practices are either economically justified or too deeply
rooted in public demand to make an assault on them advisable. The con-
cessions private enterprise wishes the United States to exact would put this
government in frequent opposition to measures of social reform and national
interest. The very system of negotiation would direct capital toward coun-
tries offering the greatest concessions rather than those offering the greatest
possibilities for development. Finally, the proposed investment treaties
would exact assurances from the underdeveloped countries without giving
any assurances in return. As a result, they seem particularly far removed
from the original conception of Point Four. 70
The Guarantee Incentive.
The shortcomings of all the previous proposals have paved the way for a
new and more extreme kind of incentive. To break the bottleneck, the
United States government would guarantee American firms against the
risks peculiar to their foreign investment.' 7 ' This proposal accepts the in-
guards that are desirable. Analysis shows the practical limitation of these provisions.
No great stimulus to private investment can be expected from inclusion of similar
provisions in treaties that are still below the Uruguayan standard.
170. "Guaranties to the investor must be balanced by guaranties in the interest of the
people whose resources and whose labor go into these developments." Point Four address
of the President, supra note 1. The mutuality of obligations in Point Four development
is recognized in the Point Four bill, H.R. 7346, Sec. 2 (c): "Technical assistance and
capital investment can make maximum contributions to economic development only where
there is . .. due respect for the legitimate interests of the peoples of the countries to
which the assistance is given . . . and of the countries from which the assistance and
investment are derived. In the case of investment this involves confidence on the part of
the people of the underdeveloped areas that investors will conserve as well as develop
local resources, will bear a fair share of local taxes and observe local laws, and will nego-
tiate adequate wages and working conditions for local labor." Even if investors gave
such "guarantees," how could they be enforced? Furthermore, when an underdeveloped
country signed an investment treaty, what assurance would it have that "any American
capital would actually be invested, that any American goods or technical processes would
actually be made available, or that anything at all would happen . . ."? WARUURO,
"POINT FoUR"-OuR CHANCE To AcHIEvE FREED M FROM FEAR 40 (1950). Although
these considerations are important, they will receive little attention if businessmen are
permitted to write Point Four treaties in the same way as they would a commercial loan.
See, for example, the statement of N. A. Bogdan, supra note 43, at 6: "Foreign countries
must ... be led to understand that when someone who really wants to borrow goes to a
bank to raise a loan, it is the bank and not the borrower which sets the terms. After all,
we do not have to make investments abroad."
171. President Truman introduced the guarantee proposal in his Point Four message
to Congress, supra note 17, at 101-2. The reasons for the proposal are described in
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 2, at 73: "The deterrents to private investment abroad
cannot be completely removed by investment treaties, by tax incentives, or by technical
advance alone. Certain risks peculiar to investment abroad . . . will remain excessive
from the point of view of U.S. investors. For example, although a treaty may assure no
discrimination against U.S. investors seeking to remit profits, it cannot assure that
sufficient dollars for that purpose will actually be available. . . . The extension of guaran-
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evitability of foreign restrictions; it commits the American government to
make good the losses its citizens suffer as a result of them. Since guarantees
would only be granted to firms whose operations fitted Point Four require-
ments, 172 the proposal would avoid the defect of those incentives which only
spur investment generally rather than direct it for specific purposes.
The success of the guarantee program as an incentive and its cost to the
American taxpayer both depend on the risks against which guarantees are
to be given. A current proposal would guarantee American investors
against losses suffered as a result of expropriation or exchange control. 17
Limited guarantees of this kind have done little to stimulate private invest-
ment in the past. 174 They offer incomplete protection against the wide vari-
ety of hazards that face the foreign investor. A guarantee against expro-
priation, for example, does not help an investor who is put out of business
by government subsidized competition or by confiscatory taxation. A guar-
antee against inconvertibility of currency will not encourage the investor
who is deterred by the prospect of war or internal violence. To be more
than a gesture, a guarantee program would have to protect investment
against all, or most of these contingencies. 75 Such a program would raise
tees by the U.S. Government against risks peculiar to investment in foreign countries is
a means of attacking these difficulties... "
In the summer of 1949 the Administration introduced identical bills, S. 2197 and H.R.
5594, amending the Export-Import Bank Act, 59 STAT. 526; 61 STAT. 130 (1945) to enable
the Bank, in addition to its other functions, to "guarantee United States private capital
invested in productive enterprises abroad which contribute to economic development in
foreign countries against risks peculiar to such investments." See Hearings Before Ihe
Cominittee on Banking & Currency on S. 2197, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); Hearings
Before the Committee on Banking & Currency on H.R. 5594, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 19, 22,
23, 24 (1949). The bills were subsequently amended by inserting in place of "against
risks peculiar to such investments" the following: "by assuring either or both (i) the
conversion into United States dollars of foreign currency derived from an investment and
(ii) compensation in United States dollars for loss resulting from expropriation, confisca-
tion, or seizure."
172. "In issuing guarantees the [Export-Import] Bank will give full consideration to
the contribution that the investment can be expected to make to economic development.
Furthermore, we do not intend to impose our own plans of economic development on
foreign countries, and we would not, therefore, guarantee investments if those countries
themselves did not consider that the investment would make a contribution to their eco-
nomic development." Under-Secretary of State Webb in 21 DWs'T STxTs Busi.. 305,
316 (1949).
173. See note 171 supra.
174. The Economic Cooperation Administration ,was authorized to guarantee private
investments against loss through non-convertibility up to the amount of $300 million in
1948 and $150 million in 1949. As of Aug. 1, 1949, only $2.7 million in industrial guar-
antees were outstanding, and only $12.5 million in guarantee applications were under
consideration. See Hearings, supra note 171, at 22. It is true, of course, that the proposed
guarantee would compensate for losses from expropriation as well as from exchange con-
trol. It is also true that guarantees might be more widely used by private business in un-
derdeveloped countries where the risks are greater than in Western Europe. See Business
Week, Feb. 19, 1950, p. 118.
175. One proposal presented to Congress would provide U.S.-guaranteed compensation
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perplexing administrative problems-how to determine to what extent
foreign controls and practices were responsible for financial loss. Moreover,
it is doubtful that the United States government would want to guarantee
investors against ordinary business risks,1"6 or against the same forms of
government activity from which they receive no protection at home. 77
A guarantee program large enough to achieve significant results would
have to be extremely expensive. There is no apparent way of offsetting the
cost. Investors who received guarantees could, of course, be made to pay
insurance premiums. But it is difficult, if not impossible, to assess premiums
for risks of this kind. Insurance schemes are effective only when they cover
predictable risks and non-related events. The risks facing foreign invest-
ment, such as expropriation or war, are unpredictable and cumulative in
nature. The sudden activity of one government could wipe out millions of
dollars of guaranteed investments. To be even roughly commensurate with
the risks involved, premiums would have to be extremely high. In that case,
the program would not be attractive to private investment. There seems no
way to avoid the necessity for substantial appropriations of government
funds.17
Despite its high cost, a guarantee program provides no assurance of suc-
cess. The program is regarded with disapproval by most representatives
of American business, mainly because of the extensive role that government
would have to play.179 There would be little point in guaranteeing projects
which were not approved both by the underdeveloped country and the
United States.' A certain amount of continued supervision would be re-
quired to assure that actual operations accorded with the specifications of
Point Four. It is doubtful that many American firms will want to submit
to possible control by two governments.
The results of a guarantee program would be novel and disquieting.
The American government, having reimbursed a private investor for his
losses, would itself pursue the private claim against the foreign govern-
for "any law, ordinance, regulation, decree, or administrative action ...which ... pre-
vents the further transaction of the business for which the guaranty was issued." See
Statement of Norman M. Littell, Hearings, supra note 171, at 87.
176. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, mipra note 2, at 74.
177. See note 159 supra.
178. These funds would probably reduce amounts available for direct government lend-
ing. So far, the administration has requested no new appropriation for guarantee activity.
But to the extent that the Export-Import Bank sets aside uncommitted funds for the
guarantee program, it will have less funds with which to make loans to foreign govern-
ments. See the criticism on this ground by Norman M. Littell, Hearings, supra note 171,
at 92.
179. See, e.g., NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 8-9: "[T]he
Council does not recommend the inclusion of 'guarantees' by the United States Govern-
ment. . . . It is convinced that 'guarantees' would tend either toward undue regulation
by the United States Government of American private enterprises operating abroad or
toward undesirable involvement of the United States government in business."
180. See note 172 supra.
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ment.'8 ' Diplomatic negotiation over what is "fair" compensation or what
is "discriminatory" legislation is likely to be complex and protracted. s'8 It
will not contribute to international good will. There is the additional danger
that the United States, faced with a threat to guaranteed investments
abroad, would be tempted to intervene in favor of the status quo.'3 Although
a program of public investment would involve similar problems, it would
at least provide greater control over the source of controversy. A guarantee
program, on the other hand, would involve national interests and national
prestige in disputes of private origin. Consequently, it has all the short-
comings and few of the advantages of direct investment by the government
itself.
PLANNING FOR WORLD DEVELOPmENT: THE
RATIONAL ADAPTION OF MEANS To ENDs
Present plans for implementing Point Four do not bear the test of exam-
ination. Tax, antitrust, treaty, and guarantee incentives are unlikely to
cause a significant increase in foreign investment. They are less likely to
spur investment in directions required by Point Four. In some ways, they
may even conflict with the basic purposes of the program. Consequently,
private enterprise cannot be given primary responsibility for foreign eco-
nomic development. If Point Four's political, economic and humanitarian
goals are to be achieved, an alternative source of capital investment will
have to be found.
8 4
The main burden of Point Four will have to be carried by the United
States government itself. 85 Only direct public financing can overcome the
181. See the Statement of Secretary Snyder, Hearings, sztpra note 171, at 10.
182. See, e.g., the variety of questions raised in EcoNomuc & SoCIAl. Coulucu., spra
note 5 (Report of the Secretary-General), at 33.
183. "[Y]ou make these investments and then there is a change in government or a
threat of a change in government, and, of course, since we have guaranteed the stability
of that government we use the force of our Government to keep in power the government
that has been friendly to us and a government which may have become unpopular with
the people of that country." Statement of Rep. O'Hara, Hearings on H.R. 5594, supra
note 171, at 55. Compare the answer of Under Secretary Webb: "I should like to state
for the record as forcefully as I can that.whatever may have been our mistakes in the
past, it is the policy of this Government not to intervene in the domestic affairs of foreign
countries. Whether or not this Government undertakes a guarantee program, that policy
will not be altered." Id. at 56.
-184. "To wait upon private capital (even when it is buttressed by guarantees of con-
vertibility, tax help and the like) is to allow the future of the underdeveloped areas to be
dependent on a very uncertain quantity.... To wait upon this uncertain element to do a
job whose success depends on a fairly steady increase of investment and income, and the
hope, opportunity and freedom that go with that, is to give up the whole program in
advance." ANDERSON AND RAUSHENBUSH, A POLICY AND A PROGRAM Fon SUccEss 50
(Public Affairs Institute, Bold New Program Series No. 1, 1950).
185. "[Hiere and now the decision to extend aid is political. In other words, it is the
United States and the Commonwealth Governments that must decide to act." The
Economist, Jan. 14, 1950, p. 59. The point is similarly expressed in HARRIS, FoaREI:
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obstacles blocking foreign development by private means. Government
investment is needed to offset the political risks and the nationalist hostility
that presently deter American business. It is needed to carry out unprofit-
able, long-range development programs. It is needed to guide development
in the interests of the backward peoples rather than by purely commercial
considerations. A program with such far-reaching political, economic, and
social effects must be carried out by an institution capable of planning in the
public rather than the private interest.
Public financing alone, however, will not insure the success of Point Four.
Unsupervised loans and grants may not be used economically. The govern-
ments of the underdeveloped countries are less likely to make efficient use
of investment funds than the recipients of the Marshall Plan."' In some
countries, investment may be dissipated on consumer goods, leaving the
population increasingly dependent on American aid. In others, it may be
channelled too rapidly into heavy industry. 1 7 Close control must be main-
tained to see that investment is employed for diversified development and
for productive purposes. Moreover, investment in these areas must be
accompanied by widespread industrial and agricultural reforms. Direct
intervention may even be necessary to insure that the primary benefits of
development are enjoyed by the whole population rather than by a privi-
leged few.mu
AID AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 13 (Public Affairs Institute, Bold New Program
Series No. 7 1950): "Where the gains accrue largely to the nation generally, then the
disburser of funds has to be the government." It seems unreasonable to expect private
investors to "see the necessity for undertaking investments in the underdeveloped countries
as an obligation imposed on them in the interests of world economic development, of the
promotion of world peace, and of the achievement of the objectives of the United Nations."
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL COUNCIL, supra note 5, App. IV (Report of Subcomm. on Ec. Devel.)
14. Foreign lending, having become a vital instrument of foreign and domestic policy, can
no longer be left entirely to individuals. See BUCHANAN & LuTz, REnUILDING TII. WORLD
ECONOMY 160-77 (1947).
186. "The institutions, the traditions, the administrative framework which made the
Marshall Plan effective, hardly exist in Asia." The Economist, Jan. 21, 1950, p. 114.
The same can be said of the other underdeveloped areas. See also The Economist, Jan.
14, 1950, p. 58: "[Tlhe underlying dilemma remains between the insufficient numbers
and insufficient experience of Asian officials and businessmen responsible for development
and the nationalism which forbids too great a dependence upon outside instruction, ex-
perience and advice."
187. See The Economist, Jan. 14, 1950, p. 59, and note 57 ,nipra.
188. "[T]o put American money into development of technologically backward areas
while leaving as they are the internal distribution of wealth and power and the existing
relation between the small omnipotent minority and the impoverished majority is to
aggravate conditions already so bad as to be volcanic. . . .Both in industry and on the
land there must be equitable taxation. . . .Any belief that the economically powerful
groups will do this voluntarily is illusory. They will do so only if compelled, and we
alone can compel them if we intervene at all with money and technical assistance. We can
[Vol. 59: 12771316
POINT FOUR: A RE-EXAMINATION
The need for such complete participation in the economic and political
life of the underdeveloped countries raises doubts that Point Four should be
directed by the United States alone. Unilateral action-or more precisely,
bilateral negotiation with recipient countries-is defended on the grounds
that it enables the most effective use of American economic power for Amer-
ican political purposes. But past experience, coupled with the high degree
of control required in Point Four development, tends to discredit this argu-
ment. When a lending nation seeks to direct the use of its funds, it subjects
itself to the criticism that it is directing the aid in its own interests rather
than in the interests of the borrowers. It assumes exclusive responsibility
for the frequent decisions which affect adversely a group or a national in-
terest. It takes the blame when aid fails to produce promised results. In
return, it is seldom the object of national gratitute or reciprocal favor.'E
International administration of the Point Four program would substitute
divided responsibility for the perils of unilateral control.' It would make
the underdeveloped countries more willing to allow the administration of aid
by outside personnel and more willing to compromise with outside demands.','
Direction of the program by an international authoritywould have the further
advantage of facilitating important regional planning which could not be un-
do so by keeping our representatives on the spot, watching the exception of the program,
threatening to withdraw unless the measures we demand are carried out, and withdraw-
ing both in money and personnel, if they are not." Peffer, Point One in a Policy for
Asia, N.Y. Times Magazine, May 14, 1950, p. 13, 62.
189. "Between individuals occasion is not unfrequently given for the exercise of grati-
tude.... But among nations they perhaps never occur. ... [T]o deduce... arguments
for a self-denying or self-sacrificing gratitude on the part of a nation, which may have
received from another good offices, is to misrepresent or misconceive what usually are,
or ought to be, the springs of national conduct. . .:' HAmToN, THE FEDEnALIs, "Tnn
LEaERs OF PAcirIcus" No. IV, 573-575 (1818 ed.). See also Disli!:e of US. Held In-
creasing Abroad, N.Y. Times, May 31, 1950, p. 1, col. 5.
190. "[S]ome parts of this development program require both a type of decision and
a type of action which the people of the United States will not want their own Department
of State to undertake single-handedly." ANDERSON & RAusnExNUsH, op. cit. supra note
184 at 30. As a matter of fact, public opinion in the United States seems favorably dis-
posed toward international control of Point Four. See Survey Favors Letting the U.N.
Handle Point 4, N.Y. Herald-Tribune, May 22, 1950, p. 3, col. 1.
191. International administration threatens the self-respect of recipient countries less
than unilateral administration; therefore it is more likely to elicit their cooperation. See
LASWELL, WORLD PoLrmcs FAcEs EcoNomcs 67-9 (1945). See Fox, PREsIDENT Tnu-
alAN's FouRTH POINT AND THE UNITE NATIONs 470 (International Conciliation No. 452
1949). "International assistance would make their dependence seem much less direct and
more general. They would instead feel that they were participating in a symbolic cam-
paign for world reconstruction and development. Furthermore, the unpalatable truths about
economic development should prove more acceptable to these countries when elaborated
through an international organization of which they are a part than if handed down by
one country." Some countries actually prohibit direct investments controlled by a foreign
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dertaken by one or two nations alone.19 It would make it possible for other
nations besides the United States to make contributions to the program,
particularly in the fields of technical knowledge and colonial administra-
tion. 19 3 Most important, an international authority could provide a rational
means of settling economic differences arising between the mature and the
underdeveloped countries, and among countries in similar stages of develop-
ment.194
Present institutions for international development fall far short of this
goal. Only one organization exists-the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development.11 The Bank has no jurisdiction over national de-
velopment policies. It lacks the resources for a large and sustained develop-
ment program.'96 Its directors have consistently pursued a conservative
government. See LEwIs, op. cit. supra note 8, at 252-3. An international authority in
which these countries were represented might be exempt from such legislation.
192. See Fox, op. cit. supra note 191, at 470. The case for regional planning on the
national and international level is given detailed presentation in McDOUGAL & -ADER,
PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND: ALLOCATION, PLANNING, AND DEVELOPMENT (1948). "[Lland-
use problems really demand regional solutions, because of the geophysical configuration of
natural areas as opposed to the artificial boundaries defining states ... ." Id. at 1070.
"Rational concern for the production and sharing of wealth and other values either in the
United States or in other countries cannot today stop short with the political boundaries
of the contemporary nation-state." Id. at 1166.
193. "Here is a field in which genuine international cooperation can expand and flourish.
No country has a monopoly of skills, knowledge, or available personnel. Certainly the
United States has no such monopoly. The amount of technical assistance will begin to
approximate the need only if all nations contribute to the joint effort." Assistant Secretary
of State Thorp in 20 DEP'T STATE BULL. 287 (1949). The Western European nations are
already sharing the burden of colonial development with the United States under the
European Recovery plan. See note 3 supra and Hearings on the Point Four Bill, Jupra,
note 23, at 419-21.
194. The demands of backward nations for primary emphasis on heavy industry, see
notes 56 and 57, suepra, and of colonial powers for development which directly aids their
own economies, see note 44 supra, are not likely to yield to unilateral pressure.
195. One of the purposes of the Bank is to encourage "international investment for the
development of the productive resources of members, thereby assisting in raising produc-
tivity, the standard of living and conditions of labor in their territories." Articles of
Agreement, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Art. iii (U.S. Treas-
ury Dep't 1944).
196. The Bank is empowered to finance development in three ways--(1) by direct loans
out of its own paid-up capital and surplus (2) by floating securities on the private capital
market and (3) by guaranteeing loans made by private investors. See Articles, supra note
195, Art. IV § 1. The total amount of loans made or guaranteed in these ways may not
exceed the Bank's total capital, reserves, and surplus. Id. Art. 3 § 3. According to the
most recent available report, capital, reserves, and surplus totalled $1.7 billion, exclusive of
$6.7 billion in uncalled for subscriptions. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 42 (1948-9). Only $1 billion of hard-currency
funds was available, however, as of March, 1949; of this, $650 million was already com-
mitted. EcoNoMIc & SOCIAL COUNCIL, supra note 5, App. I (Report of FAO) 39.
1318 [Vol. 59:1277
POINT FOUR: A RE-EXAMINATION
lending policy. This is explained by the Bank's dependence on private
investors for most of its capital funds.'97 Bound by commercial considera-
tions, the Bank has many of the shortcomings of private investment itself.
It will not finance general programs of economic development, but only
specific projects. These projects must be planned in detail; they must pre-
sent the prospect of reasonable returns. When aid is granted, it is in the
form of loans with customary rates of interest. The underdeveloped coun-
tries can rarely meet these terms. As a result, the very countries which need
assistance the most are cut off from the only available supply of international
credit. 19
Point Four requires a new international institution based on fundamen-
tally different conceptions.'99 An International Development Authority
197. See note 196 supra and Ecoxomic & SOCIAL CouNcm supra note 5, App. I (Report
of FAO) 38. This is not only a necessity, it has become a conscious policy: "In the judg-
ment of the Bank, foreign development financing should preferably be derived mainly
from private sources." IBRD REPORT, supra note 196, at 13.
198. At the end of 1949, only $174 million had been loaned by the Bank to underdeveloped
countries. ANDERSON & RAUSHERNBUSH, op. cit. jupra note 184, at 5. For a summary
and defense of the Bank's present lending policies, see EcoNouic & SocLL Cou.ciL,
.supra note 5, App. II (Memorandum Submitted by the International Bank) and IBRD
REPORT, supra note 196. The Bank takes the position that "the amount of productive in-
vestment that can be undertaken in any short period of time in the underdeveloped coun-
tries will never be such as to yield rapid or spectacular results." Memorandum, Id. at 3.
Furthermore, it claims to "have or be readily able to acquire sufficient resources to finance
all sound development projects in its member countries that are ready for execution and
that can appropriately be financed by foreign loans which arc cxpccted to be repaid."
(Emphasis added). Id. at 10. For a critical view of the Bank's activities, see Ecooxc
& SOCIAL COUNcIL, supra note 5, App. IV. (Report of Subcomm. on Ec. Devel.) 15:
"There are fields and types of investment required for economic development which can
neither satisfy the pre-conditions required by the Bank, nor carry the interest charges
involved, nor be liquidated within the period required." See also Fox, op. cit. supra note
191, at 472: "The project-by-project approach, represented by the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development... is neither broad enough or sufficiently sustained
to answer the needs of underdeveloped countries. Defense of projects in terms of their
economic justification tends to ignore other projects of a 'welfare' nature which are not
immediately remunerative but which must go along with the 'financially feasible' enter-
prises in order for the latter to succeed."
199. What follows does not purport to be anything more than a tentative proposal,
illustrating the general outlines which an internationally-administered Point Four program
might take. Specific proposals have already been put forward by the Public Affairs In-
stitute. They would channel development financing through two new institutions-an
International Resource Conservation Corporation and a Revolving Credit Fund for Co-
operatives; and through two old ones, the International Bank and the Export Import-
Bank. See ANDERSON & RAUSHENI3USH, op. cit. mpra, note 184, at 46 et seq.; and
Anderson, A Really Bold New Program, 170 Nation 490, 491 (1950). Why four institu-
tions must be used, two of which have serious limitations, is not entirely clear. At any
rate, the philosophy behind the new institution(s) is the primary thing to agree upon.
That philosophy has been eloquently summed up by the British periodical Planning:
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could be formed, operating within the United Nations. The Authority
would have the power to finance projects which could not be financed from
a country's domestic resources or from other sources under orthodox lending
principles. Aid would be in the form of interest-free loans and grants. 00
It would not be confined to regions traditionally described as underde-
veloped. It would be administered as far as possible without regard to
political considerations. Aid would be granted wherever it was likely to
produce the greatest relative increase in production and living standards. 21
The magnitude of the program cannot be entirely foreseen. It would
have to begin slowly, increasing with available administrative and technical
facilities and with the ability of underdeveloped countries to make produc-
tive use of investment funds. Eventually, total investment by the Authority
-as nearly as can be estimated from current surveys-might reach an
annual figure of $6 billion.202 The investment funds would be supplied by
subscribing nations, according to their ability to contribute. The United
"The principle(s) upon which this machinery would work must differ radically from
those on which international bodies have operated in the past, in two ways: First, the
loans should be neither private nor simply inter-governmental but operated through an
international clearing system, whose object would be equitable pooling of the burden of
international investment; secondly, the criterion should not be whether a given invcsltnlt
is likely to prove financially profitable, but whether it provides the most economical means
for relating available resources to the nost urgent human needs. (Emphasis added).
Quoted in BoNNP, op. cit. supra note 36 at 111-12. See also STALEY, Woaxa EcoNoMIC
DEVELOPMENT 83-91 (International Labour Office 1944).
200. It seems reasonable to agree with the International Bank that it is better to
render such assistance in the form of "outright grants rather than in some form of 'fuzzy'
loans which would tend to cast discredit upon the integrity of normal international in-
vestments." IBRD Report, op. cit. supra note 196, at 14. Point Four in particular
requires the avoidance of "that perilous attitude, which, in reducing all major questions
of international financial policy to a greedy huckster's concept of dollars and cents ac-
counting, threatens to lose us a rational world in order to gain a few bookkeeping entries
of no consequence in themselves." N.Y. Herald-Tribune, Feb. 1, 1946, p. 18, col. 2 (edi-
torial in connection with the pending loan to Britain).
201. A proposal roughly similar to this one was presented to the United Nations during
1949. See EcONoMIC & SOCIAL CouNcIL, supra note 5, App. IV (Report of 3d Sesg. of
Subcomm. on Ec. Devel.) 17-9. Although the proposal gained the support of the Sub-
commission of the Economic and Employment Commission, it failed to gain the approval
of the Commission itself. The Commission report, however, made a gesture of coipro-
mise toward the plan by acknowledging that, in the cases of certain countries, the U.N.
should explore "various other methods" for economic development than those currently
existing. ECONOMIC & SOCIAL CouNcIL, supra note 5, App. V, 4.
202. Perhaps the best that can be said for estimates of this kind is that they are no
more arbitrary than any other estimates. This one is based mainly on the FAO survey,
supra note 196. World requirements for foreign investment (outside of North America)
were approximated at $8.5 billion a year, based on current development plans. Of this
figure, $4 billion annually was required by underdeveloped countries. The $5 billion
figure allows for the use of funds in some areas not strictly "underdeveloped," and for
cumulative increase in the rate of development.
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States share might be about two-thirds of the total--something like 84
billion a year.
203
From present indications, such a program is certain to be attacked as too
expensive for the United States.0- 4 At its height, however, the cost to the
American people would be less than two percent of their national income.
In absolute magnitude, it would be considerably less than the average
appropriations for foreign aid made during the first four postwar years. 5
Furthermore, by improving political and economic conditions in the back-
ward areas, it might considerably reduce the need for emergency economic
and military assistance, currently being dispensed in hasty and disorganized
fashion in far-flung corners of the globe. Measured against the need for the
program and the benefits it can achieve, the cost does not seem unreason-
able.
American business may be expected to oppose an internationally-directed
Point Four program if it appears to spell the end of private foreign in-
vestment. This result can and should be avoided. The achievements of the
program in the backward areas may prove a more effective stimulant to
private investment than any of the incentives currently proposed. -' 5 More-
over, though Point Four would be planned and carried out by the experts
of the various participating governments, it could also utilize the organizing
ability, the technical knowledge, and the development experience of Amer-
ican and foreign enterprise. There would be room for those joint enterprises
between private investors and governments which have enjoyed a con-
siderable measure of success in the past. - 7 The Point Four program would
afford an opportunity to determine whether private enterprise and govern-
ment can really cooperate for mutual benefit and a common purpose.
A final objection to such a program is likely to be levelled at the possibility
203. This is more conservative than some proposals. Sen. Brien licMahon has sug-
gested U.S. aid of $10 billion a year for a five-year period, conditioned on Soviet accep-
tance of effective atomic energy control. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1950, p. 1, col. 4.
Seymour Harris advocates American investment in the program of about $5 billion
annually. HARRs, op. cit. supra note 185, at 7, 11, 70. On the other hand, Morris
Rosenthal has proposed American aid of $2 billion a year over a five-year period. RosE:Z-
THAI., op. cit. supra note 8, at 53.
204. The 81st Congress was in no mood for increased foreign spending. Even $45
million for technical assistance was attacked as unnecessary and was eventually cut down.
See notes 3 and 9 suPra.
205. Government loans and grants abroad totalled $25 billion for 1946-9. See note 8
supra,
206. By providing underdeveloped countries with foreign exchange and greater pro-
ductivity, public investment could have a "pump-priming" effect on private investment.
See EcoNomic & SociAL. COUNCIL, .rpra note 5, (Report of the Secretary-General) 36.
207. An outstanding example is Nelson Rockefeller's International Basic Economy
Corporation. For a description of this and other experiments in "partnership capitalism,"
see Fortune, Feb. 1950, p. 81; Hutcheson, Government and Capital in Point Foutr, 25
Fo~aR.Gx PoLicy Rm'oaRs 66,69-72 (1949).
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of participation by the Soviet Union and its allies. Giving the Soviet bloc a
minority influence in the administration of Point Four would certainly raise
problems that the United States would not have if it retained e.xclusive con-
trol. But few members of the Soviet bloc still belong to the specialized
agencies of the United Nations which would handle the bulk of development
administration. Neither the Soviet Union nor its allies would be eligible for
aid unless they allowed free access to United Nations technicians and private
enterprise of foreign countries. They would also have to make available
necessary economic data, as well as permit international supervision over
national development projects."' The Soviet bloc countries, if they par-
ticipated at all, would have to participate on terms favorable to international
political and economic cooperation.
For the time being, at least, participation by the Soviet Union itself
seems unlikely."'9 But several countries, not yet entirely absorbed in the
Soviet sphere, would have a great interest in joining the program. Some
of them still retain economic ties with the West. An international develop-
ment program would offer an attractive alternative to the ruthlessly ex-
ploitative "Molotov Plan." 210 Eventually, the program might replace
the present trend toward economic and political division with united
activity for the general benefit. The contribution to the prestige and
power of the United Nations, and to the future of world peace, would
208. These seem reasonable and necessary conditions to attach to investment under
Point Four. It is interesting to note that similar provisions were included with refer-
ence to technical assistance under H.R. 7346. Assistance was to be given to countries
which would (1) pay a fair share of the cost (2) provide all necessary information and
give the program full publicity (3) coordinate local plans of technical cooperation (4)
endeavor to make effective use of the results and (5) cooperate with other participants
in the program in the exchange of technical knowledge and skills. Id. § 7(c) Compare
these requirements with the political requirements of the Herter Bill (H.R. 6026), supra
note 11.
209. The Soviet Union however, has been the verbal champion of development of the
backward areas during recent U.N. meetings. See, e.g., EcoNoMIc & SOCIAL COUNCIL,
supra note 5, App. V, 4. An American proposal for a large program of world develop-
ment might well force the Soviets into an embarrassing dilemma. Refusal to cooperate
might lose them the propaganda initiative in the backward areas; cooperation would mean
raising the iron curtain and modifying their traditional pattern of autarchy. For the
background of Soviet foreign economic policy, and the problems it raises for cooperation
with the West, see GARDNER, THE PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC COLLABORATION WITH Tun
SoviaT UNioN (unpublished mss. in Widener Library, Harvard, and Yale Law Library,
1948).
210. Satellites whose economies still have a strongly westward orientation are Poland
and Czechoslovakia. These, and other Eastern bloc countries, would find Point Four a
happy contrast to the Soviet system of "putting almost nothing in and taking almost every-
thing out" (as charged at the U.N. by Yugoslav delegate Joza Vilfan, quoted in Yokobson,
supra note 16, at 136). For a summary of Russia's postwar economic activities in Eastern
Europe, see id. at 134-6.
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be considerable. In days of hopelessness and despair, a boldly conceived
Point Four program offers at least a chance for reuniting a divided world.2 11
211. The outbreak of war in Korea followed by a few days the completion of thi Com-
ment The immediate increase in military expenditures requested by the President-$10
billions-was more than twice the amount that has been suggested here as the annual Ameri-
can contribution to a comprehensive program of international development. The United
States seems likely to be preoccupied for some time with military considerations. An
imaginative program of economic development, however, may still represent the least expen-
sive and most efilcient way to halt the advance of Communism. The results may be slow
and unspectacular, but they could some day be decisive. Secretary of State Acheson made
this point in his Statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, .spra note 2: "The
fight for freedom and democracy has been going on for more than 2,000 years. It will not be
won in a decade. The question that concerns us is whether it will be going our way ten
years from now ... [P]art of that answer, I am convinced, lies in the energy, the shill
and the faith that we put into this Point Four program."
